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to bring the sum total of human knowledge together in one place
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INTRODUCTION
In the ancient world a seeker of knowledge could journey to Alexan-
dria for its library, which is fabled to have contained all the world's
learning. The Library of Alexandria has become a metaphor for a future
digital source of all recorded knowledge. Commentators have called for
the rebuilding of the Library of Alexandria in cyberspace.' Google's lat-
est effort with respect to the digitization of books represents a major step
in this direction. Google's major new initiative is to undertake the task of
digitizing the world's collection of books so as to make them search-
able.2 The very idea is audacious, but what is more so is that Google
plans to copy without first seeking the permission of the owners of these
works.3 Google Print would make available what is, by conventional
measures at least, the highest grade of information-books produced by
millions of the world's leading scholars. This is in stark contrast to the
inconsistent quality spectrum one encounters through other online
sources such as peer-to-peer networks and blogs, where there currently
exists little mechanism for peer review or other means of quality control.
What Google proposes to do is either the largest example of copyright
infringement in history or the largest example of fair use in history.
Google knows where to go to find books; it has partnered with six of
the best libraries in the English-speaking world and plans to scan digital
copies of these massive collections, shelf by shelf, book by book, page
by page. These libraries are the New York City Public Library, Oxford
University Library, the University of Michigan Library, Harvard Univer-
sity Library, Stanford University Library and most recently, the
University of California Library. With the New York and Oxford librar-
ies, Google will only copy works in the public domain, while the
domestic university libraries will allow copying of their entire collec-
tions .
Why these libraries? One obvious commonality is that they are some
of the finest research libraries in the world, containing some of the larg-
I. See Brewster Kahle, founder, The Internet Archive, Speech to the Library of Con-
gress in the Digital Future Series (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://www.archive.org/details/
cspan-brewsterkahle (last visited Dec. 7, 2006).
2. Writ large, this is the Google Print Library Project, which is comprised of Google
Print for Publishing and Google Print for Libraries. The latter is the concern here. Google
appears to be in the process of a name change for the overall program to Google Books. I will
here use the term Google Print Library Project, or Google Print project for short, as this is the
name that appears in the formal legal documents.
3. See Complaint at 6, The Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 20, 2005)("The digital archiving of the Works that are the subject of this lawsuit
was undertaken by Google as part of its Google Print Library Project.").
4. See Chris Gaither, Google Puts Book Copying On Hold, Los ANGELES TtMES, Au-
gust 13, 2005, at Cl.
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est and best collections of books in existence. Google has said relatively
little about its choice of libraries as partners. Basic questions such as will
Google copy the same book more than once if it appears in more than
one library have been left unanswered. Partnering with world-leading
libraries serves Google's purpose of allowing the libraries to perform an
editing function. If none of these libraries carries pulp fiction, for in-
stance, then these texts will not be available for searching on Google
Print. Thus, despite Google's stated intention to make the entire world's
information accessible, it is better said that they are going after a large
slice of this information
Two major lawsuits have been filed against Google. The American
Association of University Presses, which represents 125 university
presses, has sued Google, seeking a declaration that Google is commit-
ting copyright infringement by scanning books and an injunction against
6Google Print. A second lawsuit, a class action representing "published
authors and The Authors Guild," seeks declaratory and injunctive relief
and money damages as well.7 The outcome of these lawsuits is far from
clear and the stakes are huge.
Given the potential scope of the infringement claims, the Google
Print lawsuit creates an important new uncertainly in copyright law. It
was only recently that commentators 8 were cautiously hoping the
5. As will be discussed below, this decision to limit copying to the types of book con-
tained in libraries, especially leading research libraries, is likely to play in Google's favor
when it comes to proffering a fair use defense to the lawsuits for copyright infringement. If
there is a greater public value for the unauthorized use, then there is a greater likelihood of the
court finding the use to be a fair one. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
6. See Complaint at 2, McGraw Hill Cos. v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Oct. 19, 2005).
7. See Complaint, The Author's Guild, supra note 3 at 11-13. There may be many
library books whose copyrights are not owned by extant publishers. Copyrights in these books
may be owned by defunct publishers, or the copyrights may have been retained by the authors
and are now controlled either by them or their heirs, who may be either deceased or cannot be
found. Works whose owners are difficult to track down are sometimes labeled "orphan works."
The Author's Guild lawsuit claims to represent the owners of orphan works. Orphan works
increasingly play a role in copyright policy discussions and will play an important role in the
following analysis. See Lawrence Lessig, Editorial, Let a Thousand Googles Bloom; Copy-
right Reform is Vital to the Spread of Culture and Information, Los ANGELES TIMES, January
12, 2005, at B1I. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
8. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Symposium Review, The Intent Element of Induced
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 402 (2006) ("Most ob-
servers believed that the Supreme Court would use Grokster as a vehicle to reassess the scope
and continued viability of its reasoning in Sony. The Court did implicitly reaffirm the analysis
of Sony but failed to further clarify it, opting instead to embrace a theory of active inducement
in copyright law. The Court reasoned that the staple article of commerce concept in section
271(c) is simply a method used to impute intent of the relevant infringer to facilitate
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Supreme Court's recent decision in MGM v. Grokster9 would help clarify
copyright in cyberspace. One might suppose that the new uncertainly
added by the Google Print lawsuits raises a completely distinct set of
issues from those raised by Grokster If one steps back from a black-
letter analysis to a policy level, however, internet search and peer-to-peer
networking are related in their ultimate concern for wide public access to
a powerful and comprehensive source of knowledge and information,
metaphorically, the Library of Alexandria. Nevertheless, there is one
crucial difference between search engines and peer-to-peer networks;
users of Grokster's software accessed content possessed by other users,
whereas, with Google Print, users will access a vast universe of content
stored on Google servers. The former model is extraordinarily de-
centralized while the latter model is extraordinarily centralized when it
comes to the treatment of the data made available to users. Google's cen-
tralized approach requires vast databases.' ° The alternative between
centralization and decentralization of creative content storage determines
the central copyright dispute-indirect or secondary liability when the
defendant is not a database builder and thus not a direct copier (e.g.,
Napster, Aimster, Grokster, Streamcast) and direct infringement liability
when the defendant is a database builder and thus a direct copier (e.g.,
Google).
A policy argument proffered by amici for defendants in Grokster
noted that, while the peer-to-peer networks at issue were being used to
share pirated music, they also possessed the transformative potential to
connect seekers of knowledge with sources of knowledge on a universal
scale. In other words, peer-to-peer networks were characterized as a
gateway to the digital Library of Alexandria." This hopeful vision played
an instrumental role in the policy prescriptions of those commentators
who argued that the music piracy brought about by the peer-to-peer net-
works should be tolerated in order to promote the substantial non-
infringing uses already in existence, but more importantly, to allow for a
technological infrastructure that would support the emergence of the
digital Library of Alexandria.
infringement by others. The Court recognized, however, that Sony does not comprise the uni-
verse of third-party liability in copyright law ... ").
9. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
10. John Markoff & Saul Hansell, Google's Not-So-Secret Weapon in Computing Power
Wars, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 14, 2006, at Finance 16, available at 2006 WLNR
10320289 ("Google has constructed the biggest computer in the world, and it's a hidden as-
set," quoting Danny Hillis, a supercomputing pioneer and co-founder of Applied Minds, a
technology consulting firm).
11. Brief of Media Studies Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-
11, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480).
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With search engines, by contrast, the greatly enhanced access to
knowledge is not merely a promise of good things to come in the fu-
ture. 2 Given the transformative potential of Google Print, courts are
likely to be particularly open to policy-based arguments from the liti-
gants and amici. Indeed, given that Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 3 is the last
Supreme Court case to deal with fair use in a significant manner, and
given that this case is from the pre-Internet era, it would not be surpris-
ing for the Google Print lawsuits to eventually reach the Court. Whether
this occurs will, in large part, depend on whether the district court fol-
lows or departs from Kelly v. Arriba Soft, the recent, groundbreaking,
Ninth Circuit opinion on fair use in the context of search engines. 4 The
Google Print lawsuits were filed in the Second Circuit, which tends to
take a less permissive approach to fair use than the Ninth Circuit, raising
the prospect of a circuit split.
Clearly, the Google Print lawsuits present issues of fundamental im-
portance to copyright law and to core operating assumptions of the
information age, as the ultimate issue is the battle for control of the con-
tent searched by search engines. Thus, as search engines grow in
economic and social importance, so too will the issues surrounding their
governance. Accordingly, the policy issues at stake in this matter go far
beyond the particular disputants. In fact, given the nature of Google's
business model, the policy issues extend beyond the purview of U.S.
copyright law. The lawsuits have significant global implications because
Google as a business has an extraordinary and growing global reach, and
impacts the lives of millions abroad, both end-users who access Google
in over one-hundred languages, and foreign copyright owners whose
books will end up digitized into Google's database without their permis-
sion. Not surprisingly, international reaction to the Google Print project
has been strong. Strikingly, French Prime Minister Jacque Chirac reacted
to the announcement of Google Print with great alarm, seeing further
evidence of American hyper-capitalism bent on destroying European
culture. Chirac called for the European Union to respond in kind, threat-
ening to set off a search engine arms race.15
12. Indeed, one of Justice Ginsburg's main points in her Grokster concurrence is that
there is great uncertainty as to whether the peer-to-peer networks at issue will ever grow into
the great contributors to knowledge imagined by defendants and their supporting amici. Grok-
ster 125 S. Ct. at 2764.
13. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
14. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). An even more recent case
dealing with fair use in the context of search engines that is likely to have a bearing on the
court's thinking is Perfect 10 Inc. v. Google Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
15. See Julie Meyer, France Searches for its Own Google, Bus. WEEK ONLINE,
March 30, 2006, http://www.businessweek.comlglobalbizlcontentlmar2006/gb20060330
38531 1.htm.
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While Chirac's rhetoric may be hyperbolic, the issues he raises are
serious. An important question raised by the Google Print lawsuits, both
domestically and internationally, is whether something as important as
the digital Library of Alexandria should be in the control of a private
company. In a larger sense, the issue is the future structure of libraries.
Previously, it was taken for granted that libraries served the public and
were provided by public means. The Google Print project, however, calls
this assumption into question, raising the prospect that the universal,
digital library of the future will be a private entity driven by the motive
of profit maximization.
Moreover, if Google is successful, one can count on its near com-
petitors to act in a similar manner when it comes to unauthorized
scanning of book owners' works. The market forces that drove Google to
scan the world's books without authorization are not unique to Google.
Google's nearest competitors in internet search are Yahoo and Microsoft,
both of whom are actively seeking to develop databases to compete withS • 16
Google Print for libraries. To date, however, each has avoided unau-
thorized scanning of the sort in which Google has begun to engage.
Thus, Google is not unique in its strategic position or sense of business
opportunity-just less risk adverse. Should Google prevail, risks will be
dramatically decreased and one can expect competitors to rush in. Ulti-
mately, the issue may evolve into one as to whether there will be a fair
use exception in copyright law for search engines, or worse, a break-
down in copyright protection for books akin to what has occurred in the
music industry over the past decade. 7
In general, Google's business model is to collect as much informa-
tion as possible. It has the breathtakingly grandiose ambition to organize
and make accessible all of the world's information." Thus, it may not
only be book publishers that have reason to fear a Google victory on the
fair use issue, as Google and its competitors might seek to add unauthor-
ized copies of other types of digital content, such as movies and music,
16. Google conducted 49% of internet searches in 2005, as compared to Yahoo's ap-
proximately 23%. Microsoft is a distant third but has recently greatly increased its
commitment to internet search and its long awaited new software, Vista, purportedly will pro-
vide greatly enhanced search functionality. Kevin J. Delaney, Google's Net Soars, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 20, 2006, at A3; Leslie Walker, Google's Goal: A Worldwide Web of Books, WASHING-
TON POST, May 18, 2006, at DI ("Google is not alone in trying to digitize books. Yahoo,
Microsoft and other Internet players have joined a collaborative effort called the Open Content
Alliance, which is planning to digitize not only library books, but other types of multimedia,
as well, making them all accessible on the web."). Google also faces competition from re-
gional players. For example, Baidu.com is the leading search engine in China.
17. Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 10 PLAGIARY,
Feb. 3, 2006, at 11-12, http://www.plagiary.org/papers-and-perspectives.htm.
18. See Chris Gaither, Google Puts Book Copying On Hold, Los ANGELES TIMES, Au-
gust 13, 2005; DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 67, 85 (2005).
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to their databases. After all, public libraries loan out DVDs and CDs.' 9
With a favorable fair use decision under its belt, there appears to be no
reason Google or some other search engine could not start scanning
these works with the permission of the libraries but without the permis-
sion of the copyright owners. 2° Thus, Google fights not just for Google
Print for books but for permissive database building generally. Indeed,
given that Google has a better fair use defense in the context of academi-
cally-oriented works than with more overtly entertainment-oriented
content, one might well surmise that its book copying project represents
a strategic choice by Google of a favorable initial battleground. This
could establish a favorable precedent for future, even more controversial,
copying projects in what promises to be a larger, protracted struggle."
Despite the large stakes at play, the Google Print lawsuits may not be
destined to settle, as the parties appear far apart on core issues, and set-
tlement will require at least one of the parties to alter its legal position
significantly. The publishers must feel as if they have no choice but to
sue. They must feel like their peers in the music and film industries felt
five or six years ago; not quite believing that someone else's business
model calls for the unauthorized copying of hundreds of thousands of
their copyrighted works. Nor is it likely that Google will push to settle.
Without Google's large appetite for risk and a large war chest to support
this appetite, it would not have gotten to this point, as Google undoubt-
edly has received advice from its lawyers that Google Print presents a
serious risk of massive infringement liability. Judging by Google's be-
havior, it appears to be settling in for a good fight rather than looking to
take its marbles off the table. Some of Google's actions can be read as
provocative, such as when it gave the publishers a very limited time to
respond after making a counter-proposal to the publishers' demand to
19. See, Norman Oder, The DVD Predicament, LIBRARY JOURNAL, Nov. 15 2005, at 38.
Google has already been sued for its treatment of the image content of others. See Perfect 10
Inc. v. Google Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
20. Bob Barr & Pat Schroeder, Commentary, Reining in Google, WASHINGTON TIMES,
November 3, 2005, at A18. Barr noted:
Authors may be the first targets in Google's drive to make the intellectual property
of others a cost-free inventory for delivery of its ad content, but we will hardly be
the last. Media companies, engineering firms, software designers, architects, scien-
tists, manufacturers, entertainers and professional services firms all produce
products that could easily be considered for "fair use" by Google.
Id. (asserting that the book project will lead to widespread piracy). Bob Barr is a former mem-
ber of the House Judiciary Committee, and columnist and analyst for CNN; Pat Schroeder is
former Congresswoman and presidential candidate.
21. Google's recent acquisition of YouTube is seen by many commentators as an invita-
tion to a whole new wave of copyright infringement suits. See, e.g., Noam Cohen, YouTube Is
Purging Copyrighted Clips, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C8.
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either license their works or cease and desist. This action appears need-
lessly pugnacious. Thus, it is fair to conclude that, while Google may not
be spoiling for a fight, the company does not appear especially interested
in avoiding one.
Google has some reason for optimism, as its plan appears to have
met with some degree of public approval, which may be a harbinger of
things to come, given the significant role that evolving public norms re-
garding internet search might play in the determination of legal
outcomes.2' Librarians and other academics will likely be seen as
weighty norm authorities; some have already weighed in strongly in fa-
vor of the project. For example, Mary Sue Coleman, President of the
University of Michigan, has come out strongly in favor of the Google
Print project.24 Google may also take heart in the fact that it has the par-
ticipating libraries on its side. In some quarters, the response to Google's
project has been downright ecstatic." Some members of the copyright
policy community have been equally emphatic in their support.2' But this
response is far from universal, suggesting that the battle for the hearts
27
and minds of the general public will be spirited.
It is conventional wisdom that companies are risk adverse and will
seek to settle.2 The aggressiveness of Google's actions stands in stark
22. See Burt Helm, Google's Plan Doesn't Scan, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Aug. 12,
2005,
http://www.businessweek.comtechnology/content/aug2005/tc200508l2_4324_tcl 19.htm.
23. See generally, STEVEN HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD (2004) (discussing
the role of norms in online contexts).
24. See Mary Sue Coleman, Editorial, Riches We Must Share ... , WASHINGTON POST,
October 22, 2005, at A21.
25. See, e.g., Stephen H. Wildstrom, The Web Hits the Stacks: Yahoo! And Google are
Pushing to Scan the World's Books, BUSINESS WEEK, July 25, 2005, at 22. ("Even if I end up
having to go to a university library to see the whole book, this still strikes me as a powerful
tool that I would have died for in my student days. As useful as the Web is, Google Print
shows how much is missing."); Yuki Noguchi, Google Delays Book Scanning; Copyright
Concerns Slow Project, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 13, 2005, at Dl (quoting David Sohn of the
Center for Democracy and Technology, stating with regard to Google Print that, " 'It's an
example of how the Internet offers a lot of great opportunities for disseminating information,
and it is important to resolve those [copyright] issues so we really take advantage of those
opportunities.' ").
26. See Chris Gaither, Google Puts Book Copying On Hold, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug.
13, 2005, at C2 (stating that Jonathan Zittrain of the Harvard Law School "said that Google
probably would win in court if it ever came to that. Its efforts benefit society by introducing
new books to people and it's hard to argue that publishers would lose business because Google
lets people read snippets.").
27. See, e.g., Barr & Schroeder, supra note 20 ("Not only is Google trying to rewrite
copyright law, it is also crushing creativity. If publishers and authors have to spend all their
time policing Google for works they have already written, it is hard to create more. Our laws
say if you wish to copy someone's work, you must get their permission. Google wants to trash
that.").
28. See JOHN S. MURRAY, et al., NEGOTIATION 147 (1996).
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contrast to standard models of corporate behavior. Later in the Article, I
will explore possible explanations for this behavior. Behavioral psychol-
ogy may help explain Google's behavior. Given the unusual degree of
power held by Google's young heads, their current behavior can be seen
as an instance of their anchoring onto a high risk/high reward pattern of
risk preferences that has served them well in the past.
A second speculative explanation considers whether Google's ag-
gressive posture is simply a rational response to the unusually
unregulated situation in which it finds itself. In particular, changes in
technology are creating market opportunities for Google on a global
scale with rapidity that far outstrips the law's ability to respond. Thus,
Google finds itself in a legal free zone and is seeking to do its best to
exploit its opportunities. Rather than waiting for the law to adapt,
Google is adopting a proactive approach, seeking to create "private law"
that stands to be maximally favorable to its interests. Accordingly,
Google may discount victory, per se, with regard to the narrow legal is-
sues in dispute, but have larger strategic goals in mind. For example,
Google may believe that, by engaging in an all-out legal battle, the pub-
lishing industry will be forced into submission through a settlement on
terms favorable to the Google Print project.
Alternatively, Google may believe that it stands to benefit from the
massive media exposure that the litigation is likely to bring. Handled
well, the lawsuit could garner a tremendous amount of favorable free
publicity for Google Print, as Google may appear as the champion of the
little-guy end-user standing up to the media behemoths. 9 Considering all
these factors, even if Google lost on the fair use argument, it might still
come out a winner if it is able to advance its multi-pronged agenda by
means of the lawsuit.
A full explanation of the emergence of the Google Print lawsuits
may involve a cultural and ideological dimension. Bay Area digerati ap-
pear more communistic and less capitalistic than their East Coast
counterparts when it comes to respect for the exclusive rights in works in
the media and arts. The Bay Area take on creative content is best encap-
sulated in the venerable expression that information wants to be free.
The assimilation of creative works of art into information mentioned
earlier is a representative manifestation of this Zeitgeist, which may af-
fect general legal culture in the Bay Area. The norm about information
wanting to be free continues to define a certain attitude toward technol-
ogy, innovation, and the role of intellectual property. Google may be
giving an ear to theorists who take this view as a normative matter, and
29. Google prides itself on having built a world class brand while spending pennies on
advertising. See VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 183.
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who think that courts might do so as well. Bay Area defendants may
thereby have an exaggerated sense of their chances of success in a court
of law, at least, outside of the Ninth Circuit.3°
Part I of this Article will set out the complex set of facts leading up
to the filing of the Google Print lawsuit. Part II will examine the legal
and doctrinal issues presented by these facts. I will argue that plaintiffs
have a solid prima facie case for massive copyright infringement on a
scale never before seen. Google, however, will be able to counter with a
compelling and innovative use of the fair use defense. Part III will begin
to develop an economic and policy framework for examining and debat-
ing the various policy issues raised by the Google Print project and by
internet search engines more generally. This analysis will seek to answer
important questions regarding the shape and structure that regulation of
internet search engines should take. I will argue that courts seeking to
maximize social welfare should adopt a bifurcated approach under
which fair use rights are accorded to Google with respect to the copy-
right holders of orphan works, but not with respect to the holders of
non-orphan works. This approach is necessary to deal with the legacy
problem presented by orphan works created with non-digital technolo-
gies, and thus, associated with a more onerous set of transaction costs
attached to their accessibility. On a going-forward basis, however, crea-
tors of works will be properly incentivized under the approach
developed here to protect their works. Thus, over time, a non-bifurcated
regime of regulation will emerge. This will perhaps delay, but not im-
pede, the development of Google Print, or a functional equivalent, and
will foster the development of a richer market in books and creative
works more generally.
I. EVENTS LEADING Up To THE GOOGLE PRINT LAWSUIT
A. Background Facts of Google
While the story of Google's rise need not be fully replicated, the
broad outline and a few of the concrete details will be worth keeping in
mind, as they provide insight into otherwise puzzling aspects of
Google's behavior. Google, Inc. is a classic Silicon Valley garage start-
up story--on steroids. Google can one-up the paradigmatic former Hew-
lett-Packard in terms of geek-cred, as Google got its start in a graduate
30. Speaking speculatively, this norm perhaps helped produce the strongly pro-
defendant Ninth Circuit result in Grokster. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was rejected 9-0 upon
appeal to the Supreme Court. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005).
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school dorm room at Stanford, and only later moved to the relatively
more spacious accommodations afforded by a garage." The earliest his-
tory of Google generally speaks well for its founders, not only in terms
of their entrepreneurial spirit, but, more relevant to the lawsuits, of their
commitment to the public values of education and learning. For each,
higher education is a family value. Both Larry Page and Sergey Brin
come from academic families in which both parents are highly educated
in the sciences.3 From Google's early days, Page and Brin envisioned
creating things for the benefit of those engaged in the pursuit of knowl-
edge and the practical ends of science. Page's brother has a Ph.D. from
Stanford. Page and Brin were Ph.D. candidates until they became gradu-
ate school dropouts. However, long before taking Google public, Page
and Brin published a seminal academic work on search engines." The
number of academics who use Google everyday in pursuit of their re-
search is legion. 4
The Google founders first meeting with a major potential investor
came when one of Sun Microsystem's founders, Andy Bechtelshein, vis-
ited them at the garage they were renting. They met for a brief period, he
heard their idea, watched while they performed a few Google searches,
and left them with a check for $100,000. They did not ask for the money;
Bechtelshein simply offered it.35 Next, in raising $25 million, Page and
Brin were able to play two of the most prominent Silicon Valley venture
capital firms, Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia Capital, against one another.1
6
This was both a reflection of Google's market power relative to other
tech startups seeking funding, and a factor in how the Google founders
have managed to maintain an unusual amount of control over their com-
pany.
Another element of this unusual degree of control is evident in the
company's corporate governance structure. Almost unheard of in corpo-
rate America, the company is overseen by a triumvirate that includes the
middle-aged and experienced former CEO of Novell, Eric Schmidt, as
CEO and the founders serving as co-presidents and controlling share-
holders. Thus, despite being CEO, Schmidt can be outvoted two-to-one
by Page and Brin. Apparently, it was the venture capital firms that
31. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 58.
32. Id. at 21-31.
33. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 50. See also JOHN BATELLE, THE SEARCH
(Portfolio Hardcover 2005).
34. Id. at 291, 296. In addition, Google offers a service called Google Scholar. See
Daniel Terdiman, A Tool for Scholars Who Like to Dig Deep, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 25,
2004, at G6.
35. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 115.
36. Id. at 62, 66.
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pushed Page and Brin to bring in an experienced person as CEO.37 Re-
portedly, they balked and delayed the process as long as possible, finally
capitulating as Google's initial public offering began to loom large. This
is one more example in which Google evinces itself as a highly evolved
company that has learned, in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, it may be
helpful to have an expendable person at the top; a person who signs off
on the financials, etc., but who can also be easily induced to walk the
plank if crisis strikes, without leaving the organization headless.
It is fair to say that the company has never had serious funding diffi-
culties. This access to cash allowed Google to develop the sort of firm
culture that Silicon Valley high flyers were known for prior to the tech-
nology bubble bursting. The book on Google by Washington Post writer
David Vise contains a photo of the founders in a hot tub at the corporate
offices doing business on their hands-free phones." While it is this sort
of "tech-bling" that helped Google capture dollops of media attention,
behind the scenes, Google's ready access to cash allowed it the luxury to
assume a very aggressive posture in their early business dealings, and the
luxury to avoid questionable deals that hard-strapped tech companies
sometimes entered into in order to avert short-term crises. Google's ag-
gressiveness is perhaps best seen in the manner in which it stole its
business model from GoTo.com, later renamed Overture, Inc.39 Early on,
it was by no means assured that Google would become the Google of
today. In the mid- to late- 1990s, when Google was getting its start, there
were a number of companies working to bring search engines to market,
or to enhance search engines contained as part of their larger online-
related product offerings. In particular, internet search capabilities were
found as part of companies such as AOL, Excite, and Yahoo that were
developing what were then widely thought to be the dominant emerging
business model for the internet-portals. Among Silicon Valley insiders,
Google's technology and their page rank algorithm, in particular, at-
tracted admirers early on, but Google lacked a business model that
would allow it to effectively monetize its search technology. In line with
conventional thinking at the time, Google thought that the natural pro-
gression was to unite their best-of-breed search technology with a more
fully developed portal. Google was nearly acquired on the cheap in its
early days, so prevalent was the view that internet search was merely one
service among many-such as the provision of horoscopes and local
weather-that were the province of portals.40
37. Id. at 105.
38. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 150.
39. Id. at 87.
40. Indeed, search was viewed by many as a threat to the portal model, as searching the
internet leads users to other websites, while the portal business model depends on keeping
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Instead, however, Google adopted the business method of one of its
competitors. Overture was one of the companies started by Bill Gross in
his well-known Idealab. Overture is credited with developing the most
effective method for monetizing search.4' Google might have licensed
this innovative and patented business method from Overture, or it might
have developed a competitive means to monetize its own innovative
search algorithm, or it might have been acquired by a well-funded portal
with a large installed user base, but lacking an adequate search engine.
Google, however, chose a course of action different from these more
likely scenarios. Instead of licensing the business model of Overture-
which would have given Overture leverage over Google-Google simply
copied their business model and waited for the complaint from Over-
ture's lawyers to arrive in the mail. Such an aggressive business posture
is not unheard of,42 but it is a risky and potentially very expensive strat-
egy. The young history of e-commerce is littered with promising
business models, which just happened to be illegal. This is true of, for
example, mp3.com and each of the " 'sters": Napster, Aimster and Grok-
41
ster. Common sense suggests that a solid legal position is especially
desirable when the entity whose business model one is attempting to ap-
propriate is one's competitor, with the motivation to use any infraction as
a pretext to crush one, if possible. A financially precarious company
might not have dared to act in this bold and aggressive manner. Just prior
to its IPO, Google settled with Overture for 2.7 million shares. 44 In a
slightly different world, the roles of Overture and Google could have
been reversed, but, in fact, Google's venture won the day.
Google has, to this point, displayed great acumen in managing its
reputation. To an important extent, Google's cash-rich position allowed it
users within the portal's domain such that they could be peppered with advertisements and
product offerings.
41. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 87-89.
42. For example, Microsoft did not ask permission from Apple when it adopted Apple's
user interface:
Apple achieved commercial success with its Macintosh personal computer, largely
because of its distinctive user friendly graphic user interface operating environment.
Apple copyrighted the visual displays in the Macintosh operating system. Microsoft
developed a competing graphic user interface, called Windows, for IBM compatible
personal computers. In October 1985 Apple informed Microsoft that it thought
Windows infringed on its copyrighted visual displays.
Apple Computers, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 709 F. Supp. 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
43. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that
reproduction of an audio CD into computer MP3 format does not transform the work); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
44. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 188.
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the luxury to make decisions that burnished its image. Most significantly,
its large initial infusion of cash allowed it to be picky about the advertis-
ing model it adopted. In particular, Google avoided the Scylla and
Charybdis of banner ads on the one hand, and exclusive paid search, on
the other hand.4' This choice had a significant impact on the emergence
of Google's reputation as the search engine that functions in greatest
harmony with broader social interests.4
Google has demonstrated a willingness to risk this sterling reputa-
tion, at least when the stakes are high enough. This is most clearly
demonstrated by the launching of Gmail, Google's highly successful, but
also highly controversial, free email service. Gmail was greeted by some
in the tech media with great fanfare as Google offered users huge
amounts of free storage in their email accounts. The tradeoff with users
was that Google would run advertisements based on automated text
searches of the messages so that the ads would be relevant to the content
of the messages. This led to a storm of protest by privacy activists. In
fact, these groups not only went public, but they also took the unusual
step of sending a group letter to Google.48
Surprisingly, the most active and powerful online rights group, Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"), did not sign the letter. A relevant
fact in this regard may be that Brad Templeton, chairman of the Board of
49EFF, was hired by Google as a consultant. Setting aside obvious con-
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id. at 87. See also THE SEARCH, supra note 33, at 142-3:
Google was credited with being "less evil" than Overture, because it was not allow-
ing advertisers to simply buy their way to the top of the advertising heap. It was yet
another example of the Google PR halo at work-Google was the little company
that had only the best interests of the users at heart, and by not being evil, it was
rewarded with glowing press mentions and increased business from advertisers.
Id. The practical implementation of Google's "Don't Do Evil" motto appears to represent the
personal signature of the founders as well, or one of them at any rate. When asked what this
motto means, CEO Eric Schmidt said, "Whatever Sergey says it means." VISE & MALSEED,
supra note 18, at 211. Evil is in the eye of the beholder, it would seem, as Google's corporate
policies for proscribing controversial search activities appear to reflect the morality of Bay
Area twenty-something males rather than what might be proscribed by other norm entrepre-
neurs, such as the National Organization for Women. For example, regarding advertising with
Google, guns are prohibited but pornography is not. Id. at 164-167. Indeed, Google clearly
does not display a feminist morality as pornography makes up an important component of its
advertising revenues. Id.
47. See Paula Hane, Google Gets Flak, INFO. TODAY, May 1, 2004, at 12.
48. Id.
49. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 160; See Brad Templeton, Privacy Subtleties of
GMail, http://www.templetons.com/brad/gmail.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) ("I come to
this problem from two sides. One, I'm a fan of Google, and have been friends with Google
management since they started the company. I've also consulted for Google on other matters
and make surprising revenue from their Adsense program on my web site.").
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flict of interest concerns, and focusing on this fact from a business per-
spective, this represents, to speak euphemistically, an aggressive
approach to corporate sponsored norm entrepreneurship. To draw an off-
line analogy from a bygone day, this is like General Motors hiring Ralph
Nader to consult on safety issues.
Another telling fact about Google is that it went public via a so-
called Dutch auction, bypassing the standard Wall Street investment
bank route. 0 A Dutch auction, in theory, avoids an unnecessarily low
share price that leaves money on the table, and results instead in the
shares going out at their true present value.5 Thus, its Dutch auction IPO
is another strong indication of Google's market muscle and its willing-
ness to use it. This story was spun in the media at the time as another
example of Google, the corporate maverick, willing and able to buck the
• 52
Wall Street juggernaut. This story naturally has a certain popular ap-
peal, enhanced by two other factors; first, the hostile attitude toward Wall
Street in the wake of the corporate scandals of the early new millennial
decade, second, the general anti-Wall Street attitude of Bay Area tech
culture, which stems from the feeling that tech companies do all the real
work, but are forced to pay huge fees to the small tight-knit group of
banks that handle all this business.53 While the lion's share of media at-
tention focused on the David and Goliath angle of the story of Google
going public, the story is also pregnant with meaning about the financial
prowess of the brash young men at the helm of Google. They were used
to getting their way and were particularly happy to do so if it meant be-
having in an anti-authoritarian manner, such as the Dutch auction
represented.
Perhaps the central insight to be gleaned from Google's short yet
storied history is that, in the experience of its founders, big sums of
money are relatively easy to come by and money can solve corporate
problems. This is a company that is run with a personal signature-two
in fact-and behavioral economics predict that the founders think their
bold gambits are repeatable.-4 Past success at high risk/high reward gam-
bits-especially in Google's adoption of Overture's business model and
their development of Gmail, despite a serious threat of damage to their
50. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 172.
51. See 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 138 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1987)
52. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 168-180.
53. The extent to which the banks benefit from their interactions with tech companies is
not only demonstrated by the huge fees associated with the deals, but is also supplemented by
the fact that offerings of highly-valued companies typically rise in early trading, and initial
shares go to the banks' favored clients that can unload them in early trading. Id. at 171.
54. Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and Phrenol-
ogy, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1705 (1998).
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reputation within the tech vanguard, might lead Google to overestimate
its chances of success in its Google Print endeavor.
B. Chronology Leading Up To the Lawsuit
In the Introduction, I noted an advantage to discussing an important
lawsuit in its infancy namely, that as the future is yet to be told, there is
some chance that analysis and discussion may lead to constructive de-
velopments in the actual lawsuit and may give policy makers a chance to
change the outcome, rather than merely learn from the outcome. With
Google Print, there is a great deal at stake with regard to defining the
role of fair use within the context of search engines, and for the online
world more broadly. But, there may be disadvantages to studying a law-
suit in its infancy, as well. A simple but significant disadvantage is that
much of the information helpful for understanding the issues may not be
readily available or open to the public, since the suit has yet to be waged.
In the present case, however, this concern does not materialize. This has
been a high profile lawsuit for two mutually reinforcing reasons. First,
the media generally gives Google a great deal of attention, so media
coverage of the events leading up to the lawsuit and of the lawsuit itself
has been aggressive. Second, much attention to the issue has been driven
by the parties themselves, each serving as quite conscious norm entre-
preneurs; Google in a confident and effective manner, and the publishers
in an initially flat-footed and halting manner, which has improved. In
order to spin the issue in the media, and therefore in the public con-
sciousness, each of the parties has made statements or provided
information revealing a good deal about their under girding situations,
the complex host of facts, and the basic features of their legal positions.
The level of information provided to the public by each party repre-
sents a compromise between conflicting factors. On the one hand, there
is good reason to withhold information during a lawsuit; first, such in-
formation might be of use to one's opponents and second, one might
take positions that could foreclose future litigation strategies. On the
other hand, the compelling public nature of the Google Print project cre-
ates a strong countervailing tendency to release information about the
project to the public sphere so that the releasing party puts itself in a po-
sition to control the message, rather than putting itself in a reactive
posture by leaving its opponent to control the initial public perception.
Google made sure to secure the initial opportunity to spin public
perception by keeping the project a secret from the plaintiffs prior to go-
ing public. From the very start, plaintiffs felt wrongfully left in the dark
on an issue that materially concerned them, and they let their feelings be
known. Once the project became public, however, copyright owners and
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Google began behind-the-scenes talks. These talks went nowhere, and
the parties increasingly took their cases to the public.
Of particular interest is a six page open letter from Peter Givier, the
Executive Director of the Association of American University Presses to
Alexander Macgillivray, a senior intellectual property lawyer for
Google.55 It will be worthwhile to describe the contents of this letter in
detail. The letter opens with an introduction to the organization and its
membership. Givier notes that the 125 members of the organization are
all "non-profit scholarly publishers," mostly affiliated with universities
in the United States and Canada, along with "scholarly societies, muse-
ums, and non-degree-granting research institutions. 56  This first
paragraph establishes that the complainants are not-for-profit organiza-
tions involved in scholarship and research. Each of these categories is
privileged under U.S. copyright law.57 As discussed in greater detail in
Part H, under established fair use doctrine a not-for-profit use counts in
a defendant's favor. The publishers highlight the fact that, while defen-
dant Google is for-profit, the publishers are not. The fair use doctrine
supports the basic goal of copyright, which is to promote the production
and dissemination of creative expression. 8 Here, the publishers are mak-
ing it clear they are professionally engaged in support of such creative
expression in the form of scholarship and research. They might wish to
intimate that, despite the superego fantasies of the Google founders, go-
ing public was Google's pact with the devil, and it is now legally
committed to praying at the altar of shareholder value maximization, and
any talk of Google's higher mission is mere puffery.
The next paragraph of the letter raises the claims to the level of out-
right gloating. Givier notes that the peer-reviewed publications of his
organization's members set the "gold standard for excellence of informa-
tion," winning hundreds of prizes yearly for the large number of
publications. 9 The paragraph ends, "Major research libraries in the Eng-
lish-speaking world routinely buy all the books and journals published
by AAUP members."6 On the one hand, this statement highlights the
high quality of the publishers' work product; their works are so well re-
garded that libraries have the confidence to simply buy whole
catalogues. In this sense, the plaintiffs set the market for new scholarly
55. Letter from Peter Givier, Executive Director, The Association of American Univer-
sity Presses, to Alexander Macgillivray, Senior Intellectual Property and Product Counsel,
Google, Inc. (May 20, 2005).
56. Id.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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works worthy of library inclusion. On the other hand, the statement also
gives the publishers enhanced moral and legal standing in the lawsuit;
since all their books are purchased by libraries, all their back catalogues
will be in the sea of books copied by Google's scanning machines.
Next, the letter describes circumstances under which numerous
member publishers entered into agreements with Google in the program
Google Print for Publishers. This is a separate program from Google
Print for Libraries-the program at issue in the lawsuit. Givier notes that
many of the publishers thought the program had potential, and they
signed up for it with "great enthusiasm." The letter goes on to describe
the member's "confus[ion] and "surprise" at the fact that, at the same
time Google was negotiating with them regarding the Publisher project,
it was developing the Library project, and yet did not mention anything
about it to the publishers, even though the interests of the publishers
were clearly implicated. As the letter notes, the confusion grew into con-
cern as the publishers learned more about the Library project, which
''appears to involve systematic infringement of copyright on a massive
,,61
scale.
The letter admits that the prospect that anyone with a computer and
internet access will be able to use Google to search the complete collec-
tions of four American university libraries plus the public domain
material from the New York Public Library and the Bodleian Library at
Oxford, is "enormously seductive." 62 The letter adds, however, that "in
our view it is built on a fundamental, broad-sweeping violation of the
Copyright Act, and this large-scale infringement has the potential for
serious financial damage" to the organization's members. 6 This last
point is of critical importance, and the letter spends the next paragraph
making out its substance in detail. This is an important point to drive
home to the media and general public, as it is not common knowledge
how university presses and other not-for-profit publications run their
businesses. In light of the fact that university presses are affiliated with
universities, one might assume that they are well-funded arms of the
universities, like other components of the university. Thus, one might
expect that Harvard University Press and Stanford University Press are
in good financial shape, not because of the number of books they are
selling, but because they are arms of well-endowed universities. The let-
ter notes,
Although they are nonprofits and many of them receive an oper-





The Half-Fairness of Google's Plan
have payrolls to meet and bills to pay, and in 2003, the most re-
cent year for which we have such data, total university support
only averaged about 13% of their operating revenue. Virtually all
the rest of the money required to recover costs and stay in busi-
ness must come from the sale and licensing of their publications,
and as in any publishing business, copyright plays an utterly
fundamental role in establishing the legal basis on which their
business rests. 64
For emphasis, Givier concludes with a final jab at Google's plans, "For
the members of AAUP, most of whom struggle to break even in the best
of times, the risk posed is serious indeed."
65
The letter then lists a series of questions on behalf of its members.
The letter implores Google to answer the questions, and concludes omi-
nously that, unless the publishers gain a greater understanding and
acceptance of Google's plans, the publishers' alarm and concern about
Google Print for Libraries would only grow. The letter then provides six-
teen numbered paragraphs containing a m6lange of questions seeking
factual information, questions seeking legal positions or explanations,
and statements that can only be described as making rhetorical flour-
ishes. Somewhat tendentiously, the letter references and attaches a
document from the publisher's website entitled "Copyright and the Costs
of Scholarly Publishing." This is a one-page statement explaining in
simple, straightforward language the connection between respect for
copyright and the continued production of scholarly works. Since there
is no new information for Google in this document, its inclusion is pre-
sumably meant to convey a message to the public audience that Google
needs to refresh itself on these basic facts of scholarly production. At its
most poignant, the statement reads:
Respect for copyright is essential to making this system work.
Copyright infringement violates authors' rights and, like any
other form of theft, increases the burden on those who abide by
the law. It puts pressure on prices, reduces publishing capacity,
increases deficits, and shrinks resources needed for change, ex-
66perimentation, and growth.
After this moral expulsion, the letter ends with a plea for understanding
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AAUP calls on all members of the university community-
students, faculty, and administrators-to respect the obligation
of university presses to strike a balance between the need for ac-
cess to the information they publish, and the twin imperatives of
protecting the legal rights of their authors and recovering pub-
lishing costs."
This last text is particularly poignant, as university presses are at the
nexus of competing forces, forced to play a policy role in "balancing"
competing interests (in contrast to Google, which does not balance, but
instead maximizes one thing, profit).
While not providing answers to the pointed questions posed in the
AAUP's letter, Google has provided information about the Google Print
project to win over the public and the participating libraries. The librar-
ies were brought on board before Google went public with the project,
and Google may fall back on its contractual understandings with the li-
braries. Nevertheless, Google must worry that if there is a strong public
backlash to the proposed project, the libraries might get cold feet regard-
ing their promised participation. While Google might enforce the terms
of its contracts with the participating libraries, if the project becomes a
public relations nightmare, it is possible that Google would allow the
libraries to back out of participation without legal consequences. Thus, it
matters tremendously to Google that what it says to the media and to the
public on its website works to convince the public of the desirability of
the project, or at the least does not sour the public on the project. The
publishers' open letter succeeded in calling public attention to the law-
suits. Google temporarily put a halt to its scanning in November of 2005
to conduct talks with plaintiffs, but soon resumed its scanning full
force.68
For its part, Google has used both its website and its various contacts
with the media to provide the public with information pertinent to the
Google Print project. A good deal of this information on the website is
presented as general information to potential participants in the program.
Google thinks that its actions are a fair use and in accord with the
69broader purposes of copyright law. Moreover, Google arguably has case
67. Id.
68. Edward Wyatt, Google Library Database is Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at
B9.
69. On its website, Google states:
The use Google makes is fully consistent with both the history of fair use under
copyright law, and also all the principles underlying copyright law itself. Copyright
law has always been about ensuring that authors will continue to write books and
publishers continue to sell them. By making books easier to find, buy, and borrow
from libraries, Google Book Search helps increase the incentives for authors to
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law on its side," support from universities," and the support of the par-
ticipating libraries. Google claims that the public interest will be served
by greater access to books and that copyright owners will not be harmed,
due to an increase in book sales." In addition, Google claims to be going
out of its way to make available the opportunity to opt out of the pro-71
gram. Such statements serve two complimentary purposes apart from
any useful information conveyed to users. First, they are geared to win
over the hearts and minds of the general public regarding the social util-
ity of the Google Print project. Second, the statements set up Google's
legal defenses, as discussed below.
II. THE GOOGLE PRINT LAWSUIT
This Part will discuss the Google Print lawsuits from a social scien-
tific perspective. The actual lawsuits are in their early stages, so there is
not much to discuss in terms of actual events in the litigation. In lieu of
dissecting events that have not yet transpired, the goal will be to predict
the likely course of future events and to be in a better position to alter
this course. Normative arguments will be reserved for Part III.
The broad structure of the lawsuits is relatively straightforward.
Plaintiffs seek damages and an injunction based on a theory of copyright
infringement to stop Google from going forward with the Google Print
project. Plaintiffs' success will depend on their ability to make out the
elements of a prima facie case of infringement and defendant's inability
to offer a compelling affirmative defense. For a prima facie showing of
infringement by reproduction, plaintiffs must show ownership and
write and publishers to sell books. To achieve that goal, we need to make copies of
books, but these copies are permitted under copyright law.
Google Book Search Publisher Questions, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/
publisherjlibrary.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006). See also WASH. INTERNET DAILY, January
19, 2006 ("[C]ase law shows Google Book Search as not seeming to break copyright law in
letter or spirit .... The Google Book Search program plainly appears to meet the standards of
the 'fair use doctrine.'" (quoting Nancie Marzulla, president of Defenders of Property
Rights)).
70. See generally Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
71. Coleman, supra note 24.
72. Stephen Foley, Google Seeks to Defuse Row Over Copyright, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), October 11, 2006, at 45 ("Google is setting out to mollify critics in the media indus-
try... with promises... to work with publishers to boost book sales... ").
73. Id. See also ROBIN JEWELER, AM. LAW Div., THE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH PROJECT:
IS ONLINE INDEXING A FAIR USE UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW? CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. FOR
CONG., at CRS-2 (Dec. 28, 2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documentsl
organizationl59028.pdf ("Google essentially contends that its opt out program negates any
infringement liability.").
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copying. This boiler plate test is more fully spelled out as the need to
show ownership, copying in fact, and a sufficient level of copying to
constitute a substantial taking." In the present circumstances, making
out the prima facie case is a trivial exercise, at least for the publishers'
lawsuit. The ownership interests involved are the copyrights to the li-
brary books that are scheduled to be scanned. The university presses
hold many of these copyrights, having been assigned them by authors. In
the class action brought on behalf of the copyright holders of orphan
works, the situation is more complex, as the lawsuit seeks to represent
all writers whose books are scanned by Google.76
Once ownership is established, plaintiffs must establish copying of
the texts by defendants. The question then is: what instances of copying
do plaintiffs allege? The popular press suggests that the acts of copying
occur during the production of the snippets of text served up to the end77
users. The Google Print project involves three discrete types of copy-
ing, any of which could create infringement liability for Google's
unauthorized users. First, there is the giving of snippets as search results
to end users. Crucially, however, this operation involves Google first
making whole copies of texts. Thus, the production of whole copies for
its database is the second type of copying Google engages in. Finally,
Google provides the participating libraries with digital copies of those
78books supplied by the libraries.
It is highly likely that plaintiffs will seek to establish a prima facie
case of infringement for each of these types of copying, at least to the
extent that the copying has already occurred. At this point, however, it is
not clear how much copying has actually occurred. Scanning of books
has occurred at the University of Michigan and, presumably, Google has
given digital copies back to the University. But, the lawsuit is about
more than the copying that has already occurred. Plaintiffs seek an in-
junction to stop Google's planned copying and a declaration that such
copying is unlawful. Google cannot deny its plans to copy in each of the
three ways mentioned above. In the case of the University of Michigan
Library, Google cannot deny it has already copied. Instead, Google will
seek to justify this copying. Thus, the real controversy will not be the
74. Arriba Soft, 336 F3d at 817.
75. Id.
76. The Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20,
2005).
77. But see Wash. Internet Daily, supra note 69 ("Google's program is no threat to
property rights, since users can view only snippets ...... (paraphrasing Nancie Marzulla,
president of Defenders of Property Rights and an attorney specializing in IP rights protec-
tion)).
78. See Google Book Search Publisher Questions, supra note 69 ("[T]he library will
get a digital copy of the book as a part of their collection.").
[Vol. 13:1
The Half-Fairness of Google's Plan
ability of plaintiffs to make out the prima facie case, but the ability of
Google to make out an affirmative defense.
Google will seek to establish a fair use defense. 9 Another possible
defense is de minimus use, which means that a use is too insignificant to
rise to a level that creates liability, even though the elements of a prima
facie case are technically satisfied. Judge Leval, one of the federal
bench's most esteemed copyright experts, argues that the de minimus
defense deserves to play a more pronounced role in copyright jurispru-
dence than it currently does, suggesting an increased openness to this
defense in the courts (or, at least in the Second Circuit).8° However,
based on its public pronouncements, Google does not plan to offer such
a defense." One may aptly apply many labels to a plan to copy millions
of books, but de minimus is not one of them. Thus, the following discus-
sion will focus on the fair use defense.
A. Is Google Print a Fair Use?
A claim of copyright infringement is subject to certain statutory ex-
ceptions. The fair use exception "permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster."82 The statute sets out
four factors to consider when determining whether a particular use is a
fair use.8' The statute provides little detailed guidance as to weighing of
the four factors in relation to one another. Fair use is often thought to be
an inquiry of uncertain outcome.84 One version of legal realism, for in-
stance, would contend that the outcome depends on what the judge has
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
80. See Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449
(1996-1997). For further development, see Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
81. Answer, McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Google, No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2006)
(JES). In its Answer in the McGraw-Hill lawsuit, Google offers a creatively large number of
defenses (thirteen), but de minimus use is not one of them.
82. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 621 F2d 57, 60
(2d Cir. 1980). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106, 107 (2006).
83. The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
84. See ALAN LATMAN & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 473-75
(2d ed., Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
Fall 2006]
24 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
for breakfast. 5 This extreme form of anti-formalism over-emphasizes the
amount of discretion in fair use analysis. When considering all of the
factors together, however, the courts typically speak in vague terms of
the need to balance the four factors. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in
Arriba Soft says, "We must balance these factors in light of the objec-
tives of copyright law, rather than view them as definitive or
determinative tests"
86
In the popular press, the legal issues concerning fair use are drasti-
cally simplified. Journalists often write as if there is one generic fair use
test to apply to Google Print for Libraries." This treatment has been fos-
tered by Google's PR campaign, which focuses on the simple
perspective of creating an online card catalogue. What could be simpler
than that: one card catalogue; one test for fair use. The metaphor of a
card catalogue fits within Google's overall public relations strategy to
characterize the project as fundamentally about research and learning. In
fact, the court's treatment of fair use issue will be quite nuanced and
complex for a few reasons.
In theory, each putatively wrongful act merits its own infringement
analysis and fair use test. There is an inherent tension, however, between
the fact specific nature of fair use analysis and a notable feature of the
lawsuit, that the class of works in the lawsuit numbers in the thousands,
or even the millions. The obvious question is: how is it possible to en-
gage in a fact specific fair use analysis of all of these works? For
example, with some works, factor two might favor plaintiffs, while with
other works, it might favor defendants. Thus, one could argue that the
only sensible approach to the fair use test during litigation is to consider
each work separately.
It is likely that the court will reject this argument, however. Many of
the most important copyright cases involving large-scale copying of
works of a type, such as Williams & Wilkins, Sony, Napster, Texaco, and
Grokster, ignored differences between tokens of the type. 8' For example,in Sony, the type of content was television programs, but within this
85. Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making,
75 B.U. L. REv. 941, 944 (1995).
86. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
87. Georgia Harper, Google This, http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/
googlethis.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
88. In its opinion in Williams & Wilkins, the Court of Claims held that massive photo-
copying efforts by libraries could potentially constitute fair use. Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975) (per curiam); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913.
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type, works varied from Mr Rogers' Neighborhood to Monday Night
Football to The Manchurian Candidate, each of which raised distinctive
fair use considerations. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court unified the set
of actual and potential uses for the purpose of the fair use analysis. s9
Fair use calls for a case-specific treatment of the various normative
factors. For example, courts are permitted to consider other factors 9° in
addition to the basic four. One of the mantras of fair use analysis is that
the test is "equitable" and fact specific. 9' A typical application of the fair use
test quotes Congress to the effect that, while the Copyright Act codified the fair
use test in section 107, Congress did not intend to wall-off the test from future
common law development.92 Despite this, because the four factors receive
explicit recognition in the Act, the courts' apply the test with heightened
salience, such that many courts are content to apply the four factors
without weighing or even mentioning any other possible factors.
In a novel case such as this with so much at stake, one might expect
many atypical normative considerations. As already noted, the presence
of three distinct sorts of copying distinguishes Google from most in-
fringement suits, which usually involve one type of copying. Not
89. Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
90. Latman and Gorman suggested a kind of utilitarian meta-factor. See LATMAN &
GORMAN, supra note 84, at 473-75 (considering the possibility that a "public interest" factor
that outweighs all the others is "arguably bubbling under the surface of cases involving new
technology").
91. "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable defini-
tion is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, at 65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Report] reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
The legislative history of section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that Congress
intended the doctrine of fair use to continue to be articulated in a common law manner: "The
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute... " House Report at 66. Courts have noted
their freedom in this regard. See e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.
626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Congress made clear that it in no way intended to depart
from Court-created principles or to short-circuit further judicial development..."). Congress
noted that even for those courts that have articulated a fair use doctrine, the factors that have
emerged are "in no case definitive or determinative" but instead "provided some guage [sic]
for balancing the equities." House Report at 65.
Given that the law is being called on to innovate in this case and given that copyright is a
tort, one might expect-and hope-that courts would appeal to first principles of tort to illu-
minate the underlying normative situation. If there is an application, it is not obvious, at least
at first glance, however, as fair use has no correlate in typical tort. If a plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case, a defendant will not be heard to argue that the negligently caused harm to the
person is nevertheless not actionable, due to the fact that the injurious action was fair.
92. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994) ("The text
employs the terms 'including' and 'such as' in the preamble paragraph to indicate the 'illustra-
tive and not limitative' function of the examples given which thus provide only general
guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be
fair uses." (citations omitted)).
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surprisingly, this level of complexity also affects the analysis of fair use,
which, despite Google's efforts to characterize itself as a card catalogue
enhanced with snippets of text, involves correlatively three-parts as well.
Though there is no precedent analyzing a fair use claim involving
three interrelated types of copying, I argue that the best outcome predic-
tors are the cases involving two types of interrelated copying, the
"intermediate copying" cases.93 In the few intermediate copying cases
litigated to date, the courts performed separate fair use tests on each of
the types of copying, and then analyzed the relationship between them.94
I will follow this methodology below, beginning with the fair use test
applied to snippets.
There is an important conceptual reason to consider each of the three
types of copying separately for purposes of fair use analysis; while snip-
pets are intrinsically valuable vis-A-vis the ultimate purposes of
copyright, the other two types of copying are instrumental to this intrin-
sic role of snippets. Thus, an important question arises: whether a search
engine could exist as a functional equivalent of Google Print, absent a
centralized database containing the searchable content? If so, then
Google's construction of a database comprised of Whole copies of texts
may be viewed as a transaction cost that, as a matter of policy, could be
eliminated. Thus, the snippets are intrinsically of interest to copyright,
while the other types of copying are only of interest to the extent that
current technology or other factors necessitate the copying to make the
snippets available to internet searchers.
1. Fair Use of Snippets
As is standard, I will apply each of the four factors of the fair use
test in turn to the snippets. Then I will ask whether there are any addi-
tional factors that a court will likely take into consideration.
a. First Factor: Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor considers the purpose and character of the use to
which the putatively infringing copy will be put.95 In orthodox fair use
doctrine, factor one analysis involves two major considerations: whether
93. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Video Pipeline, Inc. v.
Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).
94. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519 ("Accordingly, we hold that intermediate copying of
computer object code may infringe the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner in
section 106 of the Copyright Act regardless of whether the end product of the copying also
infringes those rights. If intermediate copying is permissible under the Act, authority for such
copying must be found in one of the statutory provisions to which the rights granted in section
106 are subject.").
95. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
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the use is commercial, as opposed to not-for-profit or educational, and
whether the use is "transformative" as opposed to merely "supersed-
ing., 96 This orthodoxy cuts across the various federal circuits, despite the
fact that this two-part factor one analysis is not required by the statute.
This is an example of fair use as an atypically unpredictable legal stan-
dard, as mentioned above. The pertinent question is then: what is the
purpose or character of the use of a snippet? Google has not yet provided
any substantive legal documents to answer this question. The best indica-
tion of Google's likely response is the things they have posted on their
website.97 Generically, of course, Google claims that Google Print is not
commercial, but rather educational and highly transformative. Regarding
purpose, Google will undoubtedly argue that its mission is to provide an
electronic card catalogue.9' Google will likely argue that this purpose is
an integral element to their larger goal, providing access to the world's
information.
Factor one looks at the character of the use, not just the purpose of
the use. 99 One obvious question courts never ask is whether or not the
notion of character of a use is redundant. If not, in what sense is the
character of a use distinct from its purpose? One distinction may lie in
normative theory, which holds that some between outcomes are in-
tended, and some outcomes are not intended, yet nevertheless foreseen.
For example, Google likely will argue that the publishers stand to profit
from the Google Print project.'0° While third party profits are arguably
not Google's direct purpose, they are a foreseeable consequence of mate-
rial significance and hence, an element of the character of Google Print.
Another potentially material characteristic that Google is likely to
point to is that most copyright owners do not object to having their
books scanned and thus, the best rule requires owners who object to the
scanning to opt out of the Google Print project, rather than requiring
96. Older language distinguished between "intrinsic" uses and "productive" uses. The
Ninth Circuit states that fair use only protects users who are productive second users rather
than persons who are making ordinary or "intrinsic" uses. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
97. Google.com, Google Book Search Library Project, http://books.google.coml
googlebooks/library.html (last visited November 15, 2006)
98. Google has been criticized by Plaintiffs for making more available than just the
bibliographical information. Publishers have noted that if Google represents its project as a
card catalogue, then why does it make available more information than a card catalogue,
namely bibliographical information? The publishers note that if Google stopped there, they
would have no problem.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
100. See Yuki Noguchi, Google Delays Book Scanning; Copyright Concerns Slow Pro-
ject, Aug. 13, 2005, at DI, WASHINGTON POST (quoting Google Print product manager Adam
Smith, "We think this will help more users discover their books, and buy their books.").
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owners who want their books scanned to opt in.' °' Finally, based on its
website, Google may claim that an important characteristic of snippets is
that they are geared to show respect for copyright owners. 10 The follow-
ing discussion will first look at the issue of commercial use, and then
look at the issue of transformative use.
i. Commercial Use
When discussing commercial use, the first issue is the Sony pre-
sumption. In Sony, the Supreme Court established a presumption against
fair use when the use is commercial.' 3 This did not matter in Sony, as
the use of the VCR by consumers was deemed a non-commercial use.
Nevertheless, the presumption has been cited in a number of fair use de-
cisions. Subsequent commentators have noted that the presumption did
not conform to previous case law and was not justified by the overall
purposes of fair use. l°4 Nevertheless, numerous cases applied the pre-
sumption in the wake of Sony. In Acuff-Rose, however, the Supreme
Court backtracked from their position.05 While the Sony language is still
occasionally cited, most courts have adopted the Souter approach to
commercial use of Acuff-Rose. Thus, there is no longer a presumption
against Google's claim of fair use simply because the use is deemed
commercial. "o
Commercial use in copyright jurisprudence is a term of art, with a
meaning similar to, but not the same as, its ordinary language meaning.
Speaking in ordinary language terms, Google's use of snippets is com-
mercial, in as much as Google is a publicly traded company. But, in
copyright, this is not enough to count as a commercial use for two rea-
sons. 07 First, Google is arguably a media company like the New York
Times, and, although a publicly traded company, nevertheless, it may
still be subject to special treatment for First Amendment reasons.' 8 Sec-
101. See Google Book Search Publisher Questions, supra note 69 ("We're happy to
remove your book from our search results at any time").
102. See Google Book Search Library Project, supra note 97 ("The Library Project's aim
is simple: make it easier for people to find relevant books-specifically books they wouldn't
find any other way such as those that are out of print-while carefully respecting authors' and
publishers' copyrights.").
103. Sony Corp. of Am. V Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
104. Leval, supra note 80.
105. The Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that a commercial use of the copy-
righted material ends the inquiry under factor one. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
106. See id. at 585 ("Rather, as we explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the
proposition that the 'fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a sepa-
rate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.'"
107. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
108. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985).
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ond, although Google uses content owned by others, it does not sell or
trade the copies it makes. Some courts have been open to countenancing
such uses, deeming them not directly commercial.' 9 Let us explore these
two factors in greater detail.
The first question is whether Google stands to benefit from First
Amendment considerations. Numerous cases have privileged otherwise
commercial companies due to their status as media companies. In
Harper & Row, the Court noted that the bare fact that a media company
was commercial was not dispositive; it is typical of companies that stand
to benefit from First Amendment norms that they are commercial.' 10 This
is true, for example, of newspapers and television stations. The question
then is whether or not Google is a media company. In the past, Google
denied this appellation, but, either to reflect a changing reality or due to
proactive lawyering, it now accepts the designation."'
Google has certain features of a news organization, such as a news
service, but there is an important difference between Google and, for
example, the New York Times; Google does not provide original content,
but is a content aggregator."2 Google also has other features of a media
company, such as an advertising-driven revenue model, and, as noted in
Part I, a corporate goal to organize the world's information. Trafficking
in information is a feature of media companies. Finally, Google has a
dual-class stock ownership structure for a purpose akin to that of some
media companies, such as the Washington Post."3
Google is unlike a newspaper in a crucial respect, however. Argua-
bly, commentary and criticism are contrary to, or at least in tension with,
Google's core mission. Their mission is to organize the world's informa-
tion, an objective task. On first impression, one would expect Google to
go about this task in an objective, asocial, and scientific manner that
does not inject the company's commentary or criticism. It is worth high-
lighting that Google trumpets the fact that its searches are objective."4 If
Google wanted to, it could do more filtering or selecting of content,
which is still a milder level of subjective engagement with the material
and an intermediate step for commentary and criticism. Thus, Google's
109. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,818 (9th Cir. 2003).
110. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (noting that many of the privileged uses explicitly
mentioned in 17 U.S.C. § 107, such as comment and criticism, are, in our commercial society,
predominantly the domain of for-profit companies such as newspapers and televisions net-
works).
111. See THE SEARCH, supra note 33, at 3.
112. Interview by Maria Bartaromo with Eric Schmidt, CNBC (May 22, 2006).
113. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 176.
114. Leslie Taylor, Media Morph: Google Death Penalty, 77 ADVERTISING AGE 9 (2006)
("Google says: 'We cannot tolerate Web sites trying to manipulate search results as we aim to
provide users with relevant and objective search results ....... ").
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best argument does not depend on an appeal to the importance of free
and independent political expression in a public context. Yet Google,
with the availability of Google Print, serves the ends of comment and
criticism in a significant manner by aiding journalists, academics, and
others in their efforts. This cannot be taken for granted, as the opposite
situation is more prevalent-journalist's significant investigative en-
deavors are powerfully hampered by the practical limitations of scarce
resources. 1,5
Second, Google is likely to argue that its use of Plaintiff's works in
the production of the snippets is not commercial in the relevant sense, or
at any rate, not very commercial, because Google is not in the business
of selling snippets. Google will point to cases in which courts have been
willing to downplay the commercial role of some use under the rubric
that the use was not directly commercial. For example, in Arriba Soft, a
case discussed in greater detail in the next section, the Ninth Circuit
wrote, "As the district court found, while such use of Kelly's images was
commercial, it was more accidental and less exploitative in nature than
more traditional types of commercial use. Arriba was neither using
Kelly's images to promote its web site nor trying to profit by selling
Kelly's images." 6 Instead, Kelly's images were among thousands of im-
ages in Arriba's search engine database. Because the use of Kelly's
images was not highly exploitative, the commercial nature of the use
weighs only slightly against a finding of fair use.'""7 Similarly, a court
might well find that Google's production of snippets, while commercial,
is nevertheless not directly commercial, and so will only weigh slightly
against a finding of fair use.
The publishers will take issue with the characterization of Google as
deserving special treatment as a member of the media. For when a news-
paper or television station uses someone's copyright protected content, it
is typically on a one-off basis, that is, today it is an unauthorized photo
of some artist's daring new work and tomorrow its an unauthorized
quote from some politician's written statement on some hot button issue.
Whereas, the opposite is true of Google's planned use of plaintiffs'
works, where snippets from some popular book like the DaVinci Code
might be produced hundreds or even thousands of times a day. Thus,
115. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Richard Stengel is Chosen to Be Top Editor at ime,
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at Cl.
116. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
117. Id. at 819. A good case for plaintiffs on this issue is American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, 60 F3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). The defendants argued that Texaco's use of copies of jour-
nal articles was educational rather than commercial. The Second Circuit rejected this
argument, however, noting that the copies were a factor in Texaco's overall production proc-
ess. Id. at 921.
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plaintiffs will argue that in a relevant sense Google is indeed trafficking
in snippets in a direct manner as it uses snippets in order to attract users
to their site in order to do searches.' Once Google has this captive audi-
ence, it can then run advertisements by them."9 Thus, the real market is
in selling advertising space and snippets are a factor of production in this
end product.
It matters not only whether the use is non-commercial but also
whether the use is educational or not. Educational uses are given greater
protection. Educational use is indeed explicitly mentioned in the pream-
bular language to section 107. It will matter whether and to what
extent Google's use is found to be educational. Google will undoubtedly
argue that it is highly educational; what could be more educational than
a digital library, and a search function that can bring responsive snippets
from this library to anyone, anywhere in the world? After all, Google is
copying books from some of the top libraries in the world. As noted in
Part I, these libraries have made statements in support of their participa-
tion that clearly indicate their view that the project supports core
educational values.' 2' We are perhaps giving some advance indication of
the tone of the amicus briefs on behalf of the libraries we are likely to
see, based on an open letter to the editor by the President of the Univer-i- 122
sity of Michigan mentioned earlier.
What will publishers reply regarding educational use? It seems
highly unlikely that they would simply deny outright that Google Print
will have important educational uses. These are the same plaintiffs who
in their open letter emphasize that they represent a large number of uni-
versity presses and have as their goal the promotion of knowledge and
learning. Nevertheless, publishers do have responses open to them. First,
they might argue that a huge share of searches are unlikely to have any
real connection to truly educational uses, and that unlike a real public
library, or even a media outlet like the Nation, Google is only interested
to maximize shareholder value.
It is likely, however, that a court would find this a weak response, for
given the nature of the database-books from research libraries-it will
be implausible to deny that the knowledge contained in these books will
thereby be spread. Furthermore, the fact that perhaps this database serves
118. See Author's Guild complaint, supra note 3, 1.
119. Google has two advertising programs: AdSense and AdWords. Through AdWords,
advertisers purchase placement for ads on Google's pages, including on search results pages
and Google's Gmail web-based email service. Google's AdSense program allows pages on
third party sites to carry Google-sponsored ads and share revenue from the advertising dis-
plays.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
121. Coleman, supra note 24.
122. Id.
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as the grist for queries not overtly or intentionally educational may be all
to the good in as much as slackers doing internet searches for no overtly
worthwhile purpose might thereby accidentally get introduced to educa-
tional materials simply because these results are delivered along with
some set of search results that are perhaps more directly responsive to
their slacker queries. Metaphorically, one can see this as giving knowl-
edge legs to seek out the person rather than merely sitting back passively
in some traditional brick and mortar library waiting to be accessed by a
seeker of knowledge.
The publishers may in addition fall back on the response that the
uses do not promote education because in the long run the market for
educational books will be destroyed by the activity. 2 This argument will
be quickly, dismissed, however, as based on confusion about the nature
of factor one analysis. The query is not whether the use supports the
educational enterprise (or fails to) in some instrumental sense. Rather,
the inquiry is a more direct one that looks at the actual usage of the un-
authorized copy of plaintiff's work to see whether this use is itself
educational. For example, one cannot make DVD copies of the movie
Titanic to sell in order to raise funds for a school no matter how worth-
while the school's mission. This would not count as an educational use
despite the fact that education might in fact be instrumentally served in
some noble way. What counts as the use is the actual use of the DVD
copy of Titanic by the people who get the unauthorized copies. If they
simply watch the DVD for enjoyment in the usual manner then this will
count as a non-educational use. So too for Google Print in the opposite
direction. What will matter is whether the actual use of some particular
piece of copyright protected content is an educational use, not the fact
that this educational use serves the instrumental goal of maximizing
shareholder value for Google.
On balance, a court is likely to find that Google Print, taken as a
whole, is an important educational use that promises to profoundly pro-
mote the pursuit of knowledge. This strongly educational use will count
correspondingly strongly in Google's favor. A court is also likely, how-
ever, to find Google Print to be a commercial use, although not a direct
one. Based on what we now know, the intended use would not be di-
rectly commercial but nevertheless would be a factor of production in a
commercial enterprise.' 24 As already noted, in such circumstances, courts
have said that this sort of indirect commercial use counts against defen-
123. See Givler, supra note 55.
124. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) ("There is no
dispute that Arriba operates its web site for commercial purposes.").
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dant but weakly So.12' Before inquiring into how a court is likely to bal-
ance these countervailing considerations of commercial use versus
educational use, it is necessary to first consider the most important factor
one consideration, that of transformative use.
ii. Transformative Use
The second major consideration in analyzing factor one is whether
the unauthorized use in question is "transformative."' 2 6 While the test for
transformative use is one of two crucial considerations in contemporary
fair use doctrine, the explicit term itself is of relatively recent vintage.
27
The term is meant to capture an idea that according to Leval, goes back
to the old notion of a superseding use as found in fair use's seminal case,
Folson v. Marsh. 18 A transformative use is one that is not merely "super-
seding."'129 The test for the notion of a use that is transformative per se
was picked up by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, and in
numerous subsequent cases.130
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Justice Souter spends a good deal of ef-
fort discussing elements of fair use that are not directly before the court
in an effort to clear up what the court sees as confusions engendered by
Sony. 131 One of these efforts is to return the fair use test to the form it had
taken before Sony in terms of the importance of factor one. Sony had
stressed the importance of the fourth factor. Souter noted that factor four
need be no more important than factor one and indeed factor one is more
important.13 This position is on a par with that taken by Judge Leval. 33
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in his follow-up article, written subsequent to
Campbell, Leval gives high praise to Souter's fair use analysis. 34 The
notion of a transformative use has been championed by Judge Leval,
who claims the term "transformative" is synonymous with the older no-
tion of a use that is "productive."'3
It seems likely that the Second Circuit will follow the general logic
of first giving priority to factor one over factor four and emphasizing the
125. Id. at 818.
126. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US. 569, 579 (1994).
127. See Leval, supra note 80, at I I 11.
128. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
129. Id. at 344-45.
130. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d at 818.
131. In general, Souter provides an historical account of fair use. For each of the four
factors, he traces the correlative language in Folsom v. Marsh.
132. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591 ("But when, on the contrary, the second use is trans-
formative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily
inferred.").
133. See Leval, supra note 80.
134. Id. at 1464.
135. Id. at 1456.
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importance of the concept of transformative use. If the Second Circuit
follows the Campbell approach over the Sony approach, this is likely to
favor Google, as the arguably transformative use of the snippets is likely
to be the most important single factor in Google's favor. To understanding
why Google has a strong case for transformative use requires a better
understanding of how snippets are produced.
A snippet appears on the computer screen of the Google Print user in
response to a search request. This use is arguably highly transformative
in that thanks to Google Print, an algorithm can process a query and
search through a vast database in order to find an answer. Transformative
use is opposed to a superseding use which is an unauthorized use that
merely replaces the unauthorized copy as a substitute for the original.
Google can argue that clearly the snippet does not merely substitute for
the original as the snippet is only produced as the result of a complex,
patented secret process that depends on a complex array of factors
uniquely under Google's control. 1 6 As the publishers do not engage in
marketing snippets, Google's snippets will not replace or supersede
snippets that were formerly provided by publishers.
The snippet is a piece of text from the original work. So in this way,
it is a direct taking. But it has a transformative feature: snippets are per-
sonalized in that they satisfy a particular user's needs in a very forceful
way. Another means of getting at the notion of transformativeness is to
compare the function of a snippet with the function of a book. Unlike a
book, which provides the same big block of text to each and every
comer, the snippet serves a different purpose, which is to provide a fo-
cused response to a particular query. Indeed, in the future Google will
increasingly serve up personalized search results that vary from person
to person, depending on the information that Google has stored up on its
repeat users. 1 7 The more that Google adds to personalize the search re-
sult, the better its position to claim that its use of snippets does not
merely substitute or supersede an equivalent item that could be provided
by plaintiffs.
Google can draw on its sterling reputation in terms of trust and con-
sumer confidence in order to argue that it has developed a reputation for
objective search results.' 38 This fits into Google's factor one argument
because it can argue that not only is the snippet unique due to Google's
"secret sauce," but it is uniquely desirable due to Google's commitment
to objective results.
136. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18 at 47-50 (on the complexity of search algorithms).
137. BATELLE, supra note 33,at 258-61.
138. Barbara Quint, Old Lessons for the New Knowledge Pipeline, INFORMATION TODAY,
July 1,2003, at 7.
[Vol. 13:1
The Half-Fairness of Google's Plan
Publishers have a colorable response, however. They will argue that
snippets are not transformative in the manner that, for example, taking
an artist's photograph and turning it into a thumbnail image is transfor-
mative. 3 9 By contrast, a snippet is just a chunk out of a book. The
transformative technology is the search algorithm but that is not the
snippet. The algorithm is the means to get the snippet from the book to
the user, but the snippet is still just a chunk of text from a book.
This position mischaracterizes the nature of the test for transforma-
tive uses, however. It is not the copyright owner's work, per se, that must
be transformed, although this sometimes is the case, as in Campbell,
where the rap music group 2 Live Crew altered the lyrics and beats of
Roy Orbison's signature song, Pretty Woman. What matters is that the
use of the owner's work is transformative, not that the work, qua content
of a certain sort, is itself transformed.
In analyzing the issue of whether Google Print promises to be trans-
formative, a court will likely pay great attention to the small number of
copyright infringement cases that have arisen in the past few years in-
volving internet search engines. Most important is likely to be Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp.'40 Accordingly, it will be worth looking at this case in
detail. The plaintiff in Arriba Soft, Leslie Kelly, was a professional pho-
tographer who had copyrighted many of his images of the American
West. Some of these images were located on his web site or other web
sites with which Kelly had a license agreement. The defendant, Arriba
Soft, operated an internet search engine that displayed its results in the
form of small images rather than the more usual form of text. Arriba ob-
tained its database of pictures by copying images from other web sites.
4
'
Arriba has a computer program that "crawls" the web looking for images
to index. The crawler downloads full-sized copies of the images onto
Arriba's server. The program then uses these copies to generate smaller,
lower-resolution thumbnails of the images. Once the thumbnails are cre-
ated, the program deletes the full-sized originals from the server.
Although a user could copy these thumbnails to her computer, she can-
not increase the resolution of the thumbnail as any enlargement would
result in a loss of clarity.1
42
While subsequent discussion of this case has focused on the thumb-
nails, larger copies of plaintiff's pictures were involved as well. By
clicking on one of the thumbnails, the user could then view a larger
139. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2003). But see Perfect 10
v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (granting an injunction against Google's
use of thumbnail images of pictures of "natural" models).
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version of that same picture within the context of the Arriba web page.
When Kelly discovered that his photographs were part of Arriba's search
engine database, he brought a claim against Arriba. for copyright in-
fringement.
The district court found that Kelly had established a prima facie case
of copyright infringement based on Arriba's unauthorized reproduction
and display of Kelly's works, but that this reproduction and display con-
stituted a non-infringing "fair use" under section 107 of the Copyright
Act.'4 3 Kelly appealed that decision and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part, finding that the creation and use of the thumbnails
in the search engine was a fair use but holding further that the district
court should not have decided whether the display of the larger image
was a violation of Kelly's exclusive right to publicly display his works.
This was in contrast to the lower court, which had decided that both the
' 44
thumbnails and the larger images were a fair use.
While there are significant factual differences between the Google
Print project and the facts of Arriba Soft, nevertheless, the case provides
important support for Google's position. Most important is the analysis
of the factor one consideration of transformative use. The Ninth Circuit
wrote,
This involves more that merely a retransmission of Kelly's im-
ages in a different medium. Arriba's use of the images serves a
different function than Kelly's use-improving access to infor-
mation on the internet versus artistic expression. Furthermore, it
would be unlikely that anyone would use Arriba's thumbnails for
illustrative or aesthetic purposes because enlarging them sacri-
fices their clarity. Because Arriba's use is not superseding
Kelly's use but, rather, has created a different purpose for the
images, Arriba's use is transformave.1
Google can use this language to good effect in the present case. The
court here is using a test of the function of the use. It says "Arriba's use
of the images serves a different function than Kelly's use-improving
access to information on the internet versus artistic expression." The
question then is whether Google Print serves a different purpose than
books usually serve. Clearly Google can claim that just as with Arriba, it
too "improves access to information on the internet versus artistic ex-
pression." Clearly the first part is true, that Google improves access to
information. The Ninth Circuit does not explain what it means by saying
143. Id. at 817.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 819.
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"versus artistic expression." The idea seems to be that when Kelly offers
up his pictures, it is as artistic objects-he is a professional photographer
after all. With Arriba the images are not offered up as artistic expression,
but rather as thumbnail size search results. The court seems to suggest
that the images are of low resolution and so they are not being viewed
• . 146
for their aesthetic qualities but rather simply to supply information.
How does this apply to Google? There is the difference in facts that
Arriba involves images while Google Print involves text. Does this mat-
ter? It may matter in that it makes sense that a photograph could not be
enjoyed aesthetically online in thumbnail form to the same extent as it
could in an enhanced form. But can an equivalent argument be made for
books? Texts are unlike images in that they do not suffer from quality
degradation in the same way. Presumably the text in the Google snippet
will be just as high quality of resolution as text from an owner's own
personal digital version of the book. Still, Google has a good argument
that the functions are different. The snippet has the function of providing
a search result to an internet searcher. This is clearly a distinctive func-
tion from what the copyright owners do, which is to sell books. Arguably
the parallel is that just as the thumbnail is a diminished version of the
original, so too is the snippet a diminished version of the larger text-it
is just that it is diminished temporally in that one cannot consume a
whole book at one time but only a snippet of the whole. A more precise
parallel then would be if Arriba made a copy of a portion of the overall
photograph-a snippet of the photo. Nevertheless, this is the language
and the similarity of fact pattern on which Google will stake its claim.
Both the Ninth Circuit opinion and the district court opinion contain lan-
guage that in general shows an inclination to value search engines.1
41
Despite some difference, then, the basic parallel between these two fact
patterns withstands scrutiny. Google's proposed database of books serves
the function of a search engine, just as Arriba's thumbnails served a re-
lated, similar function of a search engine. The Ninth Circuit notes that
the District Court found Arriba's use "significantly transformative" and
the Ninth Circuit seems to as well.1
48
After engaging in an analysis of the various issues concerning trans-
formative use just discussed, a court will then consider them in light of
the previously discussed factors of the commercial nature or the educa-
tional nature of the use. Overall, the factor one test reveals the following
146. Arriba Soft did have a function on its web site whereby users could link to the
original images. In Perfect Ten v. Google, the court found that Google's use was unlikely to be
a fair use because it directly takes the market for cell phone thumbnails of Perfect Ten's copy-
righted content. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F Supp. 2d 828, 829 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
147. See Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d at 811, 819-20.
148. Id. at 817, 819-20.
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results. First, we saw that Google's use of snippets is commercial but not
directly so. Thus, this consideration will weigh in the publishers' favor
but only weakly. While these uses are weakly commercial, they are,
taken as a group, likely to strongly promote education and research and
accordingly will count strongly in favor of Google. Most important for
purposes of the factor one analysis, however, will be the extent to which
a court finds Google snippets to be a transformative use. Part of the or-
thodoxy of transformative use is: "The more transformative the new
work, the less important the other factors, including commercialism, be-
come."' 4 9 In other words, it matters not only whether a use is
transformative but how transformative it is. The more transformative, the
less other factors will matter.150 Plaintiffs are in no position to produce
snippets that connect a query to an original work via an algorithm, and
thus Google's use represents a transformation from the traditional and
typical uses of written texts in a book format. Weighing all these consid-
erations, it is likely that most courts would find that factor one of the fair
use test favors Google.
b. Second Factor: Nature of the Work
The second factor in the fair use test is the "nature of the work" that
is claimed by the plaintiff to be infringed upon.' The orthodox first dis-
tinction to consider is that between whether a work is "fact" or "fiction,"
or, as an alternative formulation would have it, the distinction between
"informational" versus "creative" works. 152 The academic publishers
who figure prominently in the Google Print lawsuit publish more works
of non-fiction than works of fiction or fantasy. Works of fiction are pro-
tected more heavily than works of non-fiction. Factual or functional
' 53
works get "thinner" protection. The idea behind this distinction is usu-
ally taken to be than there is less creativity involved in producing works
of non-fiction. This rule is often seen as implied in the constitutional
149. Id. at 818 (following Acuff-Rose).
150. Id.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
152. "Works that are creative in nature are closer to the core of intended copyright pro-
tection than are more fact-based works." A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 E3d 1004,
1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Acuff-Rose) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1991).
The court explained:
In Harper & Row, for example, we explained that President Ford could not prevent
others from copying bare historical facts from his autobiography, but that he could
prevent others from copying his "subjective descriptions and portraits of public fig-
ures.... This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin.
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norm that copyright should promote originality.14 Since information, as
such, is not original but rather factual, it merits no protection under
copyright."' With purely informational works, the protection is not for
the information, per se, but rather for its selection and arrangement.
156
With purely informational works, the precise nature of the work will of
course vary from work to work.
The fact that a work is published or unpublished also is a critical
element of its nature.157 Published works are more likely to qualify as fair
use because the first appearance of the artist's expression has already
occurred. For instance, in Arriba Soft, the court noted that Kelly's im-
ages had already appeared on the internet before Arriba used them in its
search image.
1 5 8
It is worth noting at the outset that the notion that some items are to
be distinguished from others due to the nature of their content is foreign
to the mindset at Google. As the saying goes, when you are a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. When you are a search engine, everything
looks like simple, searchable information. One of the grounding values
for Google is that its processes be scalable to the greatest extent possi-
ble. 5 Search is maximally scalable to all data when there is no
distinction between protected and unprotected content. Google, then, can
be seen as implicitly supporting a norm that might aptly be labeled "con-
tent reductionism." This norm is diametrically opposed to the very nature
of copyright law, which says that there is not one relevant category of
content-information-but rather two relevant categories-creative con-
tent on the one hand and non-creative content on the other hand. 60 Note
that whatever normative reason Google's prime movers may have for
subscribing to the content reductionism norm, Google clearly has eco-
nomic reasons as well, for notice the conclusion that follows when one
combines the content reductionism norm with the information wants to
be free norm discussed earlier.
Content is information
Information wants to be free
Therefore, content wants to be free
154. Id. at 348 ("As one pair of commentators succinctly puts it: 'The originality re-
quirement is constitutionally mandated for all works.' ").
155. Id. (" 'No one may claim originality as to facts.' This is because facts do not owe
their origin to an act of authorship.").
156. Id.
157. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985).
158. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 E3d 811, 818-20 (9th Cir. 2003).
159. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 18, at 138.
160. Within the category of creative content, there are the subcategories of protected
creative content and unprotected creative content.
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Accordingly, Googlers can be freedom fighters and have grist for their
search operations at the same time.
Returning to fair use factor two analysis, the question is how does
doctrine apply to the facts of Google? Even within the world of aca-
demic publishing, the nature of the published works varies considerably.
While publishers' works are by and large creative works in as much as
they are not merely names in a phone book, nevertheless, these are not
highly creative works of fiction or fantasy but instead many are, for bet-
ter or worse, dry, scholarly works.16 But even academic presses publish
some works of pure fiction such as collections of poetry, and factually-
oriented works such as historical works will receive some amount of
protection. 162
The publishers may argue that their works are not typical non-fiction
works. Rather, the publishers will note that their reputation is of such a
sterling nature that the world's finest research libraries purchase their
new publications, often purchasing the entire catalogue. Presumably
publishers make this claim to emphasize the overwhelming market value
of their works and thus by implication the significant potential harm
publishers will suffer if this market is destroyed. The fact of the sterling
value of plaintiffs' works in their market cuts both ways, however, in
factor two analysis. On the one hand, the fact that libraries would buy
entire catalogues shows academic publishers' importance to the world of
scholarly research and cultural progress, and thus the tremendous loss to
these endeavors that might occur should the economic survival of these
publishers be threatened. On the other hand, however, the fact that these
works are of foremost research and scholarly interest also means that
Google Print's ability to make these works more accessible and search-
able is all the more important. On the whole, however, the second factor
of the fair use test is likely to favor Google in that the works are by and
large non-fiction.
c. Third Factor: Amount and Substantiality of Portion Taken
The third test looks at the amount and substantiality of the portion
taken. 63 In general, the more taken the less likely a use will be found to
be fair. The question then is what is the amount and substantiality of a
snippet? Plaintiffs have accused Google of demurring on this important
factual issue but in fact Google has noted on its website that a snippet is
161. Even non-fiction works such as historical works receive some degree of copyright
protection. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 E2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
162. See id. at 978.
163. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
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a few lines on either side of a queried text. 64 Thus, the most salient fact
regarding the amount of the portion used when it comes to the snippets
is that it is a relatively small amount. Most books contain thousands of
sentences and yet Google will provide only a few of them in response to
any given search query. While there is no hard and fast rule when it
comes to minimum limits for factor three analysis, a few sentences out
of thousands, that is, less than 1/10' of 1% seems the sort of low limit a
court will likely find to weigh in favor of Google. In Harper & Row v.
Nations Enterprises, for example, the copied text was a small percent of
ex-President Ford's memoir, yet was found not to be a fair use. 16 In the
present context as well, the brief length of the snippets should count sig-
nificantly in Google's favor. The modem trend in factor three analysis in
to avoid attempts to determine an absolute minimum. In its place is a test
promoted by the Campbell court that the amount and substantiality of
the portion must be considered in light of the purpose and character of
the use. 16 If, for example, whole copying is justified given the transfor-
mative use of the work, then the fact that there is a whole copy will not
of itself disqualify the use as fair. In other words, what matters is
whether the amount copied is reasonable in light of the use in ques-
tion. 167
Applying Souter's interpretation in the present context, Google will
argue that given that the use is for a search engine which is highly trans-
formative, the amount copied is highly appropriate, indeed minimal, as
Google is only making brief snippets of text available despite the fact
that the user's query may reference a large text. Google notes that in
making only snippets available, it is paying respect to copyright hold-
ers. 68 Google can here present compelling evidence that it is indeed
restraining its behavior due to the copyright protected status of plaintiffs'
works. The evidence is that Google allows the accessing of whole books
for works in the public domain. Thus, the implicit claim is that Google
would make full copies of plaintiffs' works available were it not for
Google's desire to show respect for plaintiffs' copyrights.
In fact, Arriba Soft contains favorable language on the factor three
test that suggests that Google might be able to make a plausible case for
164. See Google Library Project, http://print. Google.com/googleprint/library.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2006).
165. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) ("In
view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key role in the infringing work, we can-
not agree with the Second Circuit that the 'magazine took a meager, indeed an infinitesimal
amount of Ford's original language.' ").
166. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994).
167. Leval, supra note 80.
168. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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copying amounts of text larger than snippets. With regard to factor three,
the Ninth Circuit wrote:
It was necessary for Arriba to copy the entire image to allow us-
ers to recognize the image and decide whether to pursue more
information about the image or the originating web site. If Ar-
riba only copied part of the image, it would be more difficult to
identify it, thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual search
engine. 169
Google can argue that so too its search engine could be rendered more
"useful" were it to provide larger snippets or perhaps full texts.
Opposing this position, plaintiffs will argue that contrary to the ap-
parent brevity of snippets, they in fact represent a very substantial
amount of copying when one considers their length in light of Google's
stated purpose. Publishers will argue that as Google says it is interested
to provide an online card catalogue, it should be content to supply the
materials customarily contained in a card catalogue which did not pro-
vide snippets of text of the works catalogued." ° While this point has a
nice rhetorical appeal, nevertheless, it is unlikely to convince a court, as
anyone who takes the notion of an online card catalogue at all seriously
will not be wedded to the limits on functionality of such search tools in a
traditional off-line world but instead will be interested in how an online,
digital version may bring new and improved functionality. In other
words, a forward-thinking court will be inclined to view those features
particular to traditional offline card catalogues as limitations rather than
elements of their essential nature.
As noted above, the factor three test looks not only to quantity of the
materials copied, but to the "substantiality" of what is taken as well. In
particular, courts will look at whether the portion taken constitutes the
"heart" of the work.' 7' The pertinent question then is whether Google
uses the heart of the books in its database when it offers up its snippets.
The answer will depend on the particular Google search performed. For
example, one could query in such a manner that the snippet produced
was from the impeachment discussion between President Ford and Al
Haig in Ford's memoir. Here the snippet would be the heart of the work
for the simple reason that this bit of text is the key passage in the memoir
169. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
170. See Funher Obstacles to Google's Library Plans, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 20,
2005 (noting that Pat Schroeder has stated that Google's plan to have libraries scan the full
text of books goes far beyond the analogy of creating a digital version of a card catalogue,
pointing out that "If Google wants a card catalogue they can scan the book's front page for full
bibliographic data.").
171. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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of Ford's time in the White House. 72 But there is no reason to think that
this will be the typical situation. For one thing, for the average scholarly
work of the sort that will be scanned from the university libraries, it is
doubtfully the case that there are some few snippets of text that are obvi-
ously the heart of the work. Google will likely argue that snippets
represent the opposite of the heart of the work. Instead, what is taken is
whatever bit of text happens to be responsive to a search. Google Print
would presumably deliver snippets from any part of the book-the heart,
but also the lungs, ears, nose and throat.'73
Publishers have a sharp retort, however, which is to observe that in a
different sense, snippets are indeed substantial parts of works; they are
substantial in relation to the particular subjectivities of particular search-
ers. In one sense, Google gives more limited access as only snippets of
copyrighted text will be made available. Yet because of the technology
Google brings to the table, access is dramatically improved along an-
other dimension. Simply having full texts available may be too much
information. One of the staple litigators' tricks is to respond to a docu-
ment request by the opposing party with a so-called document dump, in
which as many colorably responsive documents as possible are turned
over en masse in an effort to bury the opposition in paper, with the hope
that with luck some material documents may be passed over, or at the
least, raise the cost to the opposition both in terms of money and time.
Similarly, simply providing complete works such as occurs in the peer-
to-peer world may be less valuable in its inability to proffer content pre-
cisely responsive to the greatest extent possible. By contrast, Google
provides focused results in the form of brief bits of text specific to search
requests. Thus, this can be seen as providing improved access to more
focused sets of results.
Overall, it is likely that a court will find that the amount and substan-
tiality of the snippets is a factor that favors Google, given that in general
users will be copying only a few sentences out of books that contain
thousands of sentences. While searchers may be expected to submit que-
ries that sometimes result in the copying of the heart of a work, there is
better reason to expect that this will not systematically be the case. Thus,
to the extent that a court is interested in producing a policy-oriented de-
cision that tries to provide a solution for the most prevalent type of
172. Id.
173. Although Google does not discuss it in detail, the fear is that a person could copy a
whole work one snippet at a time. Google appears to have put in place some safeguards to stop
the copying of too much text, based on comments it has made on its website. In these remarks,
Google is using the need to respect copyright as its justification for collecting personal data of
its users. Thus, on a going-forward basis, it would be wise to check to confirm that indeed
Google is being vigilant in this regard.
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situation, it will decide its factor three outcome by paying most attention
to the brief length of all snippets rather than the highly substantial nature
of a relatively small number of them or their substantial nature relative to
their particular subjectivities.
d. Market Harm
In the previous discussion, we saw that Sony set fair use analysis on
a false path for factors one and three. The same is true with factor four.
7 4
And once again, it is Campbell that reorients the court. Under Sony fac-
tor four analysis, if a use is commercial, then the burden falls on
defendant to show lack of injury.75 A second Sony doctrine is that the
fourth factor is the most important.176 There is a good chance that the
Second Circuit will follow Campbell in rejecting each of these proposi-
tions. At least this is likely to be the decided preference of Judge Leval,
who strongly praised Souter's claim that factor four analysis is concep-
tually posterior to factor one analysis.'77 It may matter a great deal to the
outcome of the lawsuit whether the court thinks either factor four is
more important, factor one is more important, or they are equal in impor-
tance. As noted earlier, Google has a strong case for the importance of
Google Print under factor one transformative use analysis. Thus, a fair
use test that favors factor one will favor Google. Plaintiffs will argue that
they are likely to suffer serious market harm and that this consideration
trumps the consideration of transformative use, even were they to grant
for the sake of argument that the consideration of transformative use fa-
vors Google. Accordingly, plaintiffs will be benefited by a fair use test
that favors factor four.
Factor four considers whether plaintiffs suffer market harm from de-
fendants' unauthorized copying. This harm may be actual or potential."'
While the notion of harm to potential markets is a test that may be diffi-
cult to administer with much certainly, courts from across federal
jurisdictions have held fast to this test. There are a few distinct argu-
ments that plaintiffs might make to support their claim of harm. The
claim that has received attention thus far concerns the issue of harm to
plaintiffs' market in selling copies of its books. Jonathan Zittrain for ex-
ample appears to think publishers' sales will actually increase and that
174. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
175. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). See
also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
176. Sony, 659 F.2d 963.
177. Leval, supra note 80.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976).
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this fact should be dispositive.' 9 The debate over the impact on book
sales is a good place to start factor four analysis as this is plaintiffs' cur-
rent actual market. Following this discussion, the issue of harm to
plaintiffs' potential market in snippet licenses will be considered.
First, consider the sort of injury plaintiffs do not suffer. The publish-
ers do not suffer a direct injury of a sort such as in a classic case like
Shapiro 'Sin which the direct infringer had set up a record bootlegging
operation and was then selling the illicit albums as a concessionaire in a
department store chain. With Google, the parallel would be if Google
were creating copies of plaintiffs' books and then began selling them
either as digital downloads or in physical copies. Instead, Google deliv-
ers snippets of text, not whole texts, and it does so for free. Thus, a key
factor in Google's favor for factor four analysis is that it does not di-
rectly compete in the marketplace by supplying superseding copies to
end users. Thus, Google is open to argue that it does not harm plaintiffs'
market. The publishers' response will be that the harm to their market
will occur in a different manner, specifically, demand for plaintiffs' texts
will be diminished because snippets will to an important extent serve as
a substitute in the market, because users may be satisfied with snippets
as a replacement for the purchase of a book.'I'
At this point, either parties' claims with regard to book sales are
speculative. Neither side has provided much by way of support for their
claims. Google does make a number of comments on its website that
give the best indication of how Google envisions the market for books
working under a legal regime in which Google Print is allowed to exist
as a fair use. Google contends that its program will increase book sales
because it will raise the exposure of the book to a whole new world of
potential purchasers who otherwise might never have learned of the exis-
tence of the book. 1
82
While speculative, it does seem very plausible that many new sales
could result through the means Google suggests, at least for those own-
ers whose books are still in print, such that they have something to sell.
Moreover, it is open to Google to argue as well that even when a book is
out of print, such that Google cannot provide a link to the current
179. See, Chris Gaither, Google Puts Book Copying On Hold, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2005, at CI (stating that Jonathan Zittrain "said that Google probably would win in court if it
ever came to that. Its efforts benefit society by introducing new books to people and it's hard
to argue that publishers would lose business because Google lets people read snippets.")
180. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
181. Michelle Kessler, Google Library Project Runs Into Resistance, U.S.A. TODAY,
Aug. 15, 2005, at 5B (stating that publishers fear Google Print will make their works vulner-
able to piracy and hurt sales).
182. Yoki Noguchi, Google Delays Book Scanning: Copyright Concerns Slow Project,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2005, at DI.
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publisher of the book, yet the end user member of the general public
stands to benefit as Google promises to direct them to any copies that
may be available in used book stores or in nearby public libraries."'
Note, however, that this last argument can be seized on by plaintiffs
to argue that indeed people may avail themselves of these alternative
outlets even when the book in question is still in print, thereby leading to
a loss of sales. Thus, each party to the dispute has a prima facie plausible
causal story to tell regarding the impact of Google's provision of snip-
pets on book sales. While somewhat speculative, it is probably a best
guess that Google has the better argument on this issue. The market
harm analysis does not end here, however. Next, consider whether plain-
tiffs suffer harm to any potential markets, for, as noted, it is clearly
established doctrine that the harm to markets is a test about not just ac-
tual markets but also potential markets. Courts have had difficulty
determining what counts as a potential market. In some theoretical sense,
any use by a defendant could be potentially licensable by this defendant
from the owner and thus any use is a harm to this sort of potential mar-
ket. Courts tend to look for some element of a pragmatically possible
market beyond such mere possibilities, however. The famous case show-
ing this is American Geophysical v. Texaco.' An important earlier case,
Williams & Wilkins had found fair use even in the face of systematic
copying of whole articles from medical journals.' s Asked to consider
facts similar in important ways, the Second Circuit in Texaco found that
photocopying was not a fair use in main part because since the decision
in Williams & Wilkins, the Copyright Clearinghouse ("CCC") had
emerged in order to license uses of the sort at issue in Texaco. This out-
come was in line with what might be predicted by an economic account.
The emergence of the CCC created a situation in which the parties were
in a position to bargain over the use of the works because the transac-
tions costs associated with doing so were lowered. Consider this issue of
transactions costs in the context of Google.
While publishers have not to this point enunciated the position, pre-
sumably it is open to them to argue that their potential market in snippets
is harmed by Google. The argument is parallel to the argument made by
183. Google.com, About Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/intlllem/
googlebooks/about.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
184. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 928-29 (2d. Cir. 1994).
185. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (per curium). The Court of
Claims held that massive photocopying efforts by libraries could in some circumstances con-
stitute fair use. An analogous situation arguably exists for Google. A finding of fair use might
indeed be a maximizing violation of copyright by lights of extant doctrine yet the prospect of
an utility gain is so substantial to outweigh the social cost. The importance of Williams &
Wilkins is that it arguably establishes that courts are willing to go far beyond existing doctrine
when the social welfare gain of doing so promises to make the gambit a good bet.
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the music labels in Napster. The labels argued that they clearly had a
potential market in digital downloads and that because defendant Nap-
ster's actions contributed toward massive unauthorized file sharing, the
legitimate market that the music industry was seeking to foster would
never come about because the copyright owners had to compete with
Napster, which gave the music away for free. Since the music cost Nap-
ster nothing to produce, it could give the music away. The copyright
owners, however, must expend resources to produce the content, such
that they could not give the music away if they were to recoup their
costs. Thus, there would never be a space for the music labels to develop
a legitimate market, as this would involve costs in terms of providing the
content and so the legitimate owners would be at a competitive disadvan-
tage in comparison to the peer-to-peer services that had almost no cost
for content provision. Plaintiffs can argue that similarly Google can give
away the snippets because they are free for it to acquire. Thus, Google's
entry into the snippet market will make it impossible for the plaintiffs to
enter this vast potential market for snippets as it will be equally impossi-
ble for them to compete with free.
Google will argue that there is no market harm regarding snippets as
plaintiffs do not market snippets, nor is this a likely or reasonable poten-
tial market for them. Texaco argued that it did not harm the market for
new subscriptions as most of the uses of the defendant, Dr. Chickering,
would not have resulted in a new journal subscription.'1 6 So too for
Google, but more so, as there is no market for snippets at all, so plain-
tiffs are losing no sales. Snippets are of transformative value when
combined with related search results that Google but not plaintiffs can
provide. There is a synergistic effect in the value of search results. The
value of the search engine comes from the breadth of the database and
other features of Google's extraordinarily sophisticated infrastructureS• •-.. 187
that cannot be replicated by plaintiffs.
Google has a strong argument, then, that there is no reasonable po-
tential market that plaintiffs have for snippets. I predict that in the overall
analysis, a court will be likely to say that there is not a significant market
186. Am. Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 928-9.
187. Plaintiffs may in addition claim harm due to an argument that rings of unjust en-
richment, as they argue that Google will benefit tremendously in financial terms and this will
not be shared with plaintiffs. See, Edward Wyatt, Google Library Database is Delayed, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at B9 (quoting Patricia Schroeder of the American Association of Pub-
lishers as stating, "That is really turning it [copyright law] on its head .... How is an author
even supposed to know that his or her work is being copied?" and reporting that "some pub-
lishers have said they were concerned that Google might begin to sell advertising related to the
results of searches of copyrighted material without sharing the revenues with the copyright
owners.").
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harm. Plaintiffs are booksellers after all, not snippet sellers, and cannot
practically become snippet sellers.
e. Aggregate Fair Use Analysis
After running through all four factors, a court will then consider all
four together and ask whether any other factors need to be considered.
We first saw that factor one, purpose and character of the use is likely to
count strongly in Google's favor. Google Print snippets are a highly
transformative, highly educational and weakly commercial use of plain-
tiffs' copyrighted works. With regard to the second factor, the nature of
the copied work, we saw that the nature of the work counts in Google's
favor as most works will be non-fictional, factual works of a sort espe-
cially useful to those who perform scientific and humanistic research and
thus within the core of the fair use rationale. We saw that factor three,
amount and substantiality of the copying, also counts in Google's favor
as snippets are quantitatively a small part of the underlying text and
qualitatively will not in the typical case constitute the heart of the work.
Finally, regarding factor four, harm to plaintiff's actual or potential mar-
ket, I argued that the test for actual harm to plaintiffs' market for book
sales is speculative but that it is more likely that plaintiffs would not suf-
fer a substantial harm to their market for book sales and might even
experience an increase in book sales. With regard to plaintiffs' potential
market for licensing snippets, I argued that it is likely that a court would
find that plaintiffs had no realistic prospect of marketing snippets of the
sort Google is capable of marketing and hence a court will not find a
harm to a potential market in snippets.
In the typical fair use analysis, there is a split such that each of the
parties has one or more factors that are determined by the court to count
in its favor. In such situations, a court must weigh all the factors together
in one grand weighing and come up with an outcome. In situations such
as the present, however, the court has an easier time as it need not weigh
among competing factors since all four could support Google. Thus,
plaintiffs' only hope is to argue that there is some fifth factor that out-
-. 188
weighs the other four. It is not obvious that there is such a fifth factor
in the present context. To this point, plaintiffs have not argued for the
existence of some compelling policy considerations that are not already
factored in under the four-factor test. Even if such a fifth factor can be
articulated, it is unlikely that a court would find that it outweighed all
four of the main factors. At any rate, there appears to be no previous case
that has done so.
188. Blake A. Field v. Google, Inc., 412 E Supp. 2d 1106, 1122-23 (D. Nev. 2006).
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2. Whole Copies of Plaintiffs' Works for Google' s Database
Its production of snippets is the most important type of unauthorized
copying engaged in by Google, but Google's snippet production is only
possible because of Google's prior copying of entire books owned by
plaintiffs. This Section considers whether these whole copies are likely
to be found to be a fair use.
a. Purpose and Character of the Use
Google will argue that it is necessary to make these full copies in or-
der for Google Print to function. Thus, the use is really identical to that
of the snippets, which is to provide an electronic card catalogue. More
narrowly, the function is to make the system operate by allowing Google
to have full copies of texts on its own proprietary database so that these
databases can be searched in response to user queries. Both Google and
outside commentators have compared Google's use of whole copies to
the use of whole copies in the usual functioning of Google's search en-
gine." 9 The comparison is inapt is one important respect, however. In the
usual functioning of Google's regular search engine, because it has cop-
ies of web pages in its system, Google does not have to go search the
internet in order to be able to apply its algorithm. Instead it is applied to
cached copies in the database. Thus, the purpose is to make Google Print
operate more efficiently. Note how this is different from the Google Print
project where copies of text are not already available on the internet. To
the contrary, many of plaintiffs' copies did not even exist in digital form.
Thus, the copies in the database are not needed to make the system run
more efficiently but to run at all. Because the lawsuit is at such an early
stage, it in not certain how the plaintiffs will reply to this argument. Pre-
sumably, if litigated to its fullest, plaintiffs would hire experts to
determine as a technical matter whether indeed Google needs to create
databases for Google Print to function, as appears to be the case.
One route for Google to take is to argue that these are "intermediate
copies." Intermediate copying is a term that has arisen out of a small set
of cases, most of which have involved reverse engineering.' 9° This is a
promising strategy because it allows Google to not have to pass the test
for this copying understood on its own terms but rather as a step in a lar-
ger process, with the larger process arguably serving as the appropriate
subject of the fair use test.
Treating whole copying as an intermediate use does not per se help
Google as not all intermediate uses are fair uses. Nevertheless, with
189. Band, supra note 17.
190. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Video Pipeline,
Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 f.3d 191 (3rd Cir. 2003).
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intermediate uses, courts may be more inclined to pay greater attention
to the final use. Thus, if the final use, the use of snippets to have an elec-
tronic card catalogue is a fair use, then it may help Google in the fair use
test of the whole copies.
Nevertheless, a court is likely to do a separate analysis as well, as
was the case in the intermediate copying cases. The court will still ask if
the purpose of the use is commercial. Just as was the case with the snip-
pets, the use of whole copies is not commercial in the strong sense that
the whole copies are sold to the public or in any way supersede copies of
books that plaintiffs sell to the public. The whole copies will be used
solely by Google.
The second part of the factor one test is the question of whether the
making of whole copies is transformative. Here is where it will matter if
defendants are successful in arguing intermediate use; that snippets are
highly transformative and whole copies are an essential element to these
snippets and so they are themselves transformative as well. It is hard to
know what a court will say to this argument. There have been relatively
few intermediate use cases. Many of them have dealt with reverse engi-
neering. Arguably this factual context is sufficiently different from that
of Google such that it may not be predictive. The reason is that with re-
verse engineering, the case also involves the issue of access to
unprotected aspects of works. 1 This is not present in Google. Another
place where intermediate use comes up is with sampling, in which the
sampler makes a whole copy as an intermediate step toward the ultimate
goal of producing a musical work which may not itself be substantially
similar to the protected work. 9 These cases are closer to Google in that
they do not involve the issue of accessing unprotected elements of
works. Here courts have tended to treat the whole copy on its own terms.
In other words, simply because the final product is not an infringement
does not mean that the intermediate copy might not be one.
b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The whole works Google plans to copy will tend to be non-fiction,
factual works of potentially great research and academic value. There is
a potentially important difference between the snippets considered above
and the whole copies. The snippets are constructed by Google by apply-
ing their search algorithm to unauthorized copies of plaintiffs' works that
Google has on its servers. By contrast the whole copies are produced by
working with research libraries to make copies of books that these librar-
ies have purchased from the publishers. This raises the issue as to
191. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
192. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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whether libraries have rights that make it legal for them to make digital
copies. This will require an examination of what privileges are accorded
to libraries under section 108 of the Copyright Act.'93 This issue will be
deferred as the present concern is over whether fair use doctrine can
support the Google Print project. If the libraries were charged with in-
fringement for themselves making digital copies, clearly it would count
in their favor that they are rightful owners of the books in question, and
that they are in general engaged in the promotion of scholarship and re-
search. The libraries, however, are not the defendants. Whatever
privilege the libraries may or may not have to make digital copies of
plaintiffs' books, say for archival purposes, is unlikely to extend to
Google, which is not a purchaser and doubtfully falls under the protec-
tion of section 108.
The plaintiffs will argue that it is not a right the library has to let
someone else make such a copy. Google might perhaps argue that it is
working as the library's agent. This would not be plausible, however,
given that Google has control over the copies made from scanning. Thus,
regarding the nature of the copied works, the fact that they tend to be
informational, scholarly works will count in Google's favor but the fact
that Google copies library copies will not provide any additional support
for their fair use claim.
c. Amount and Substantiality of the Work
Whereas the snippets considered in the previous section passed the
factor three test with flying colors due to their brevity, the copies made
for the Google database are more problematic as they are whole copies.
Making copies of complete works is frowned upon, though not prohib-
ited under the factor three analysis. The following remark is
representative. "While wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per
se, copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use."' 94 For-
tunately for Google, the Second Circuit is likely to reject the language of
earlier cases stating that whole copies can not be a fair use in favor of
language that says that unauthorized whole copying is not dispositive
against fair use.'95 Rather, the amount of copying must be appropriate in
light of the purpose and character of the copying. If the court is inclined
to think this purpose is fair-presumably in light of the overarching so-
cial value of snippet searches-then it may change its evaluation in light
of the making of a whole copy, given this language from Campbell.
193. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
194. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110,
1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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Thus, if the court is sufficiently impressed with the importance of the
transformative nature of the use, it might find these whole copies justi-
fied.
d. Market Harm
Google will likely rely again on the intermediate use argument to
claim that there is no market harm because the whole copies are only
used to produce snippets and, as discussed above, Google has a strong
argument that these snippets cause no market harm because plaintiffs do
not sell snippets, and could not possibly do so as snippets are a unique
result of applying Google's proprietary algorithm to its database, only
part of which is constituted by plaintiffs' works.
The publishers have a good response to this argument, however,
which is to point out that the analysis at hand concerns the unauthorized
full copies Google has made and plans to make of plaintiffs' works and
not the snippets. Publishers will likely argue that the intermediate use
cases are clear that the intermediate use must receive its own four-factor
analysis.' 96 Looking at the market effect, publishers will argue that they
are clearly injured because Google uses whole copies and these directly
supersede copies that could be made available by publishers, many of
whom are already in the market for licensing of digital copies.
Not only will publishers' actual market be harmed but so will their
potential market. The publishers have been adamant that if Google wins,
the end result will be a search engine exception to copyright. This claim
has great plausibility in that the other major search engines are currently
refraining from making copies of copyright protected content but surely
they would feel strong competitive pressure to follow suit if Google is
given the green light from a favorable fair use decision. They would be
at a disadvantage if their database did not contain the universe of copy-
right protected books but Google's search engine did. Not only that, but
we could expect newcomers into the search engine business. Thus, there
will develop a thriving market for search engines that use publishers'
works in the process of producing their end product. Publishers will face
even more difficulty marketing licenses of their texts if a whole industry
of search engines develops that can use them for free. The bottom line
would appear inescapably to be that Google's making whole copies of
texts significantly hurts their market for licensing copies of their prof-
fered works.
Thus, the question turns back to that of the doctrine of intermediate
use. What have courts said about the relationship between intermediate
uses and final uses that is relevant? The Sega rule is instructive. The
196. Id.
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court took the position that there was no per se rule of the sort argued by
defendants to the effect that the intermediate use was a fair use if it was
not substantially similar to the final use. Instead the court held that the
issues are logically separate; that there is no per se rule of the sort argued
by defendants, in other words, it could be the case that a final use was
transformative and yet the intermediate step is an infringement.'97
Considering all four factors together, we first saw that Google's
making of whole copies served the important purpose of making snip-
pets available to millions of users. The problem, however, is that making
these copies is not itself a transformative act as these copies merely su-
persede or replace copies of works that Google might just as soon
license from the publishers. Thus, factor one will favor the publishers.
Factor two favors Google as the works are largely non-fiction, research-
oriented works. Factor three will favor publishers as copying of whole
works is involved. Finally, factor four will favor the publishers as they
suffer a clear market harm due to the loss of licensing revenue they
might otherwise receive from Google. On balance, the publishers will
likely win on three of the four factors, including the two most important
factors, one and four, and thus Google will likely lose the fair use test for
whole copies used in the database.
3. Whole Copies to Give Back to Libraries
As noted, Google Print involves three distinct acts of copying in-
volving plaintiffs' works. In addition to the whole copying just
discussed, Google plans to make whole copies of each work copied from
the six libraries in order to give the digital copy back to the library that
supplied the original copy. Once again, we must perform a fair use
analysis.
a. Purpose and Character of the Use
Similar to the above, Google will argue that their purpose with re-
gard to the whole copies for libraries is intermediate to its larger purpose
to supply an electronic card catalogue to the world. Google has pledged
its allegiance to the project of digitizing the world's information and giv-
ing research libraries digital copies serves this purpose as the libraries
can then use their copies in new ways to increase access.
Plaintiffs will likely take a contrary position, arguing that giving
digital copies to the libraries is in no way required as part of the process
of producing snippets. In the case of the Google Print database, the
whole copies of plaintiffs' works considered in the previous section were
197. See Sega Enters. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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required, at least under current technology, in order for Google to be able
to deliver up snippets. But in the case of the copies made to give to the
libraries there is no such necessary connection between. the important
transformative purpose served by snippets and the whole copies given to
libraries. Indeed, the publishers might ask the rhetorical question; if the
libraries are such strong believers in the Google Print project, then why
do they ask for something in return for their participation?
The publishers will argue that Google uses these copies as "consid-
eration" for the benefit done for them by the libraries in making their
books available for scanning.' From the use of the language of consid-
eration, plaintiffs appear to be further setting themselves up for an
argument based on defendants' commercial use of plaintiffs' works.
Plaintiffs' complaint emphasizes the commercial nature of Google's
activities. The appeal to consideration adds one more commercial feature
to the list. Not only does defendant not pay for the copies it makes and
uses as factors of production but it adds insult to injury by going so far
as to actually use its purloined copy to generate still more copies in order
to use them as currency in the marketplace. It is not clear to what pur-
pose these copies will be put. At least in the case of the University of
Michigan, the library says it will put the copy in an archive. Publishers
may fairly wonder, however, to what uses these works might conceivably
be put in the future. The libraries might consider themselves to possess
an especially wide degree of latitude in light of the fact that Google has
contractually obligated itself to indemnify libraries for any legal liabili-
ties. It is hard to think of what the libraries could do--short of selling
copies of their copies-that could out do Google in terms of a sweeping
use of plaintiffs' works. Thus, it would seem that whatever they do will
be a fair use if Google Print is a fair use.
Google is receiving value from plaintiffs' works as witnessed by
their practice of systematically providing unauthorized copies to third
parties in return for cooperation from them. Worse yet, publishers will
argue that what Google receives from the libraries is not some random
consideration, but none other than other copies of plaintiffs' works.
Thus, Google can be seen as inducing libraries to infringe plaintiffs'
rights. Google and the six libraries engage in a value-maximizing trans-
action in which each receives something of value or else would not
engage in the exchange. Libraries trade away the temporary use of the
hard copies of their books and receive in exchange digital copies of the
same books. The libraries make out well as it costs them next to nothing
to let Google scan their books but they receive something very valuable
in return; digital copies of their books. That the libraries place a high
198. See Author's Guild Complaint, supra note 3, 1.
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value on these digital copies can be seen from the fact that prior to the
Google print project, major libraries had been engaged in efforts to digi-
tize their collections. Apparently these efforts have come to a standstill.
Presumably this is due to the fact that libraries have discovered a cheaper
source of digital copies then either making them themselves, or leasing
them from publishers, namely to get them from Google, practically for
free.' 99 Looking at the exchange in the other direction, Google also re-
ceives something valuable-hard copies of books to digitize from a
research library with its attendant potential fair use protections in ex-
change for something that it will be nearly costless for it to provide to
the libraries, digital copies of the works in question. Given that Google is
already making digital copies for its own purposes, the marginal cost of
providing an extra copy is basically zero. Thus, we see the powerful
economic force behind the exchange between Google and the libraries in
that each receives something it values highly in exchange for something
that is nearly costless for it to provide. The only fly in the ointment in
this otherwise happy model of economic exchange comes from the pub-
lishers' perspective; they are providing the legal tender, as it were, for
these exchanges and yet they receive nothing in return while all the other
parties benefit.
For purposes of factor one analysis, the question will be whether
making these extra digital copies to give to the publishers is a commer-
cial use versus a non-commercial, educational use, and whether the
copies are used in a transformative manner. For parallel reasons to those
discussed above with regard to the first two types of copying, this use is
likely to be found to be commercial as Google is a commercial enter-
prise. But this use is also likely to be found to be highly educational in
that the copies will redound to the benefit of world class, not-for-profit
research institutions. Most important, however, will be the consideration
of whether the use is transformative. Google will argue that the use is an
intermediate step toward the production of something truly transforma-
tive, the search engine capable of producing snippets. As seen in the last
section, however, the mere fact that a use is intermediate does not make
the first use transformative. The publishers will argue that Google's in-
termediate use is clearly a superseding use rather than a transformative
one because Google might just as well take out a license from the copy-
right owner that would allow it to provide a digital copy to the libraries.
Google's possible reply here is that their use is not merely superseding,
199. Google has taken an important additional step to lower the cost to the libraries,
which is to contractually promise to indemnify them for any potential legal liability. Burt
Helm, A New Page in Google's Books Fight, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, June 22, 2005, http:/!
www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2005/tc20050622_4076_tc 19.htm.
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as by and large the millions of books they have copied or plan to copy
are not possessed by the publishers in digital format, for the obvious rea-
son that most were published in a pre-digital era. Thus, the digital copies
Google gives to the libraries do not merely substitute for those of the
publishers. The publishers have a winning response to this argument,
however, as courts have been clear that a mere change in format does not
make a use transformative. 2° A court is likely to find this argument com-
pelling.
Google might, however, be able to offer a novel argument for the
transformative use of the whole copies it provides to the libraries. They
could argue that this is a practical means to reduce the chances of
Google's being able to monopolize the market for these digital works.
Indeed, it may be a very good thing from a public policy perspective that
the libraries be given these copies. For presumably this will lead to new
uses of these copies by the libraries. If one thinks that Google Print is in
general a fair use due to the argument above based on the transformative
value of snippets (apart from this third type of copying), then it may ac-
tually make sense to prefer this third type of copying in addition, as a
means to lessen Google's de facto short term monopoly on the contents
of its digital database. This outcome seems inherent in the logic of find-
ing a fair use for the first type of copying. If one thinks the ability to
provide snippets is sufficiently important to give Google a fair use privi-
lege with respect to that copying, then why not increase the likelihood
that other similar entities will be able to engage in the same sort of ac-
tivities, so as to increase the same benefits and stop Google from being
in a position to have monopoly control.
Once the libraries in question possess digital copies of their works,
they can then allow other search engine providers such as Yahoo and Mi-
crosoft to use these copies. This would allow these companies to more
effectively compete with Google, as they would not have to first engage
in the huge expense of digitizing millions of books in order to do so. In
addition, the libraries will prefer this method of spurring competition in
snippets to the one in which each snippet provider makes its own digital
copies as it will cut down on the wear and tear on the physical books.
b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor for the third type of copying does not raise novel
issues. The works copied are the same full copies of largely non-
fictional, educational works as discussed in the previous Section. Just as
was the case there, it works in Google's favor for fair use purposes that
the typical copy will be a factual work of an academic nature.
200. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F. 3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).
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c. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
As was the case in the last section, the third factor prima facie cuts
against defendants as whole texts will be copied. As noted there, post-
Campbell, the relevant test will be whether the otherwise large amount
of copying is justified in light of the nature and purpose of defendants'
use. To the extent a court takes seriously the notion that it is good anti-
monopolistic practice to give libraries a copy, it will be inclined to think
a whole copy is more justified than any lesser part as it is only the whole
copy that would put the libraries on a par with Google in terms of the
comprehensiveness of the work and thus in terms of a competitor's abil-
ity to compete with Google in the nascent marketplace for snippets.
Thus, the making of a whole copy as compared to some lesser part will
not count against Google, at least to the extent that a court takes seri-
ously the monopoly argument.
d. Market Harm
Google will argue that there is no harm to the publishers' market for
whole digital copies of their works. Google is merely supplying the li-
braries with a digital copy of a book that the library already owns. These
libraries possess the right to make such digital copies on their own. 2°
Thus, if Google could not do so more effectively, these libraries would
make digital copies, as indeed the library consortium was engaged in the
process of doing before Google Print came along. Thus, there is no harm
to the publishers' market for whole copies.
The publishers' reply will be that as many of the publishers already
offer digital versions of their works, they suffer a direct harm to their
market for these works, as libraries that get their digital copies from
Google will not have a need to get them from the publishers. It must be
kept in mind that the test for market harm is a test of potential as well as
actual markets. While most of the publishers' past works may not have
been digitized by them, on a going forward basis, publishers will increas-
ingly produce digital copies of works. Indeed, it will be nearly costless to
do so as digitization has become the standard in the publishing industry
for the production of the hard copy of books. Thus, a by-product of the
production of the hard copy is that publishers will possess digital copies
of all new works. Accordingly, they are well positioned to be providers
to a nascent market in digital copies. This is clearly a viable potential
market for publishers. Hence, a court is likely to find that the factor four
test for market harm favors the publishers over Google.
201. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2004).
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Google may also argue that there is no market harm as few extra
sales of copies would have occurred, as libraries are already buying the
physical books and would scan them themselves before paying the own-
ers. The owners can argue with more plausibility, however, that the
opposite is true, that libraries would buy digital copies as this would
surely be cheaper than going to all the bother of scanning them them-
selves.
e. Aggregate Weighing of Fair Use Factors
Weighing all the factors, we saw that the publishers will probably
win the first factor test as the whole copies given to the libraries by
Google merely supersede copies that Google might have procured from
publishers in order to offer back digital copies to the libraries. The sec-
ond factor favors Google as the copies get thin protection as factual
works. Factor three again favors plaintiffs as whole copies are made for a
purpose that is merely superseding. Regarding factor four, plaintiffs suf-
fer both actual and potential harm to their market for digital licensing of
their works. Thus, winning on three of the four factors including factors
one and four, plaintiffs should win the fair use test for the third type of
copying in which Google plans to engage.
4. Overall Fair Use Test
Above, we looked at three distinct fair use tests that arise regarding
plaintiffs' claims of infringement against Google. We saw that Google
should win the first one while plaintiffs should win the later two. The
larger question of course is how do these three tests balance out in toto.
As noted earlier, there appears to be no case involving this fact pattern
202
and the closest cases are the intermediate copying cases. The question,
then, is what guidance do they give for a situation with three types of
copying? The answer in brief is, not a lot. They tell us that there is no per
se rule but instead the uses must be judged separately. In the present cir-
cumstances, doing so indicates that a court is likely to find the use of
snippets a fair use but separately it is likely to find that maintaining a
database of all plaintiffs' works and giving digital copies of these works
to libraries are not fair uses. Thus, Google wins one and loses two. We
must reach the conclusion, then, that, overall, Google Print is unlikely to
be found to be a fair use. Importantly, however, the analysis shows that if
Google is somehow able to disaggregate its production of snippets from
the other types of copying, the situation will change, such that Google
will be likely to prevail in its defense to the infringement actions it faces.
202. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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III. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
GOOGLE PRINT PROJECT
The previous Part examined the doctrinal arguments for and against
the fair use defense to the Google Print project. We saw that as a matter
of prediction, courts will most likely find that Google Print is not a fair
use. Apart from what is likely to be the case, this Part considers what
should be the case, at least from one particular normative perspective,
that of economics. First, I will briefly discuss the general issue of the
application of the economic approach to fair use in Section A. In Section
B, I will look at the economic bona fides of the Google Print project
from this perspective. There are colorable economic arguments both pro
and con Google Print. I will first set out what I take to be the strongest
economic argument in favor of Google Print. This is an intuitively attrac-
tive argument that a number of commentators have found compelling. I
will argue that while this argument in favor of Google Print as a fair use
is initially attractive, in the end it fails. The failure is not due to any in-
herent difficulty in the economic approach to fair use. Quite the
opposite, I will argue that even if one begins with an economic norma-
tive premise, one must still conclude that an alternative array of
institutional and informal arrangements stands a better chance of deliver-
ing a superior return in terms of social welfare.
Should Google Print be a fair use? Either a yes or no answer asserts
a normative proposition. "Should" statements of this sort are the essence
of the linguistic expression of normativity. Such propositions are, logi-
cally speaking, conclusions to arguments, arguments that of necessity
contain at least one normative premise. Often in policy discourse norma-
tive premises are left implicit. This is true for a variety of reasons. The
premise may be so widely shared-either within a discipline, or a par-
ticular journal's readership, that it can be taken for granted, either as a
matter of shared epistemic commitment or as convention. Alternatively, a
policy advocate might strategically decide to leave a premise implicit
precisely because it is not taken for granted, but is instead controversial
and thus better left unstated, so as to attract less attention. For present
purposes, however, it is better to be explicit, particularly in light of the
earlier stated goal of drawing as bright of a line as possible between so-
cial scientific and normative projects, for unwittingly, or not, these
projects are easily conflated, and thus making normative premises ex-
203plicit will serve the policy neutral goal of transparency.
203. In a common law system, positive and normative theses are not logically distinct. If
the run of cases on a particular doctrinal issue displays a certain normative bent, say by
overtly promoting social welfare, then a judge may feel an increased prerogative, and possibly
sense of duty as well, to dispose of a current case in the same normative vein. Knowing this to
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As analytic normative theory is divided into consequentialist and
non-consequentialist approaches, so too one would expect that major
normative premises in copyright would be correlatively bifurcated. In the
following discussion, I will assume as a normative premise the familiar
welfarist or utilitarian desiderata that the sole ultimate justification for
policy actions is to maximize social welfare. In making this assumption,
I do not mean to either implicitly endorse or single out for criticism this
assumption, qua normative assumption. My goal is to not engage in
normative theory but rather in positive theory that encompasses norma-
tivity to the extent to which it is, or is premised to be, social scientific
fact. In Kantian terms, I intend not to proffer categorical imperatives but
rather hypothetical imperatives and ones in which I expressly disavow
any endorsement of the normative hypotheticals. This is done so as to
constrain the discussion of normativity within the bounds of social sci-
ence, albeit a behaviorally complex social science that looks to those
elements of normativity of which there may be empirical evidence. The
task in this Part, then, is to develop an economic account of the Google
Print project, but one which treats the core normative premise as a posi-
tive or descriptive assumption regarding a particular community or set of
actors.
It might be objected that a welfarist positive assumption is unwar-
ranted given that this area of the law is statutory, and public choice
theory argues more strongly in favor of a regime of statutes that serve the
cohesive interest groups that are able to drive their enactment rather than
• 204
the public interest. After all Posner and Landes themselves in the In-
troduction to their book on the economics of intellectual property go out
of their way to say that we should not expect that this area of the law
would be as systematically suited to serve general welfare, for public
205
choice sorts of reasons. Yet, contrary to this general drift, they argue
that copyright law has a strong common law component and that this is
true of fair use in particular.2° The explanation for the anomaly, accord-
ing to Landes and Posner, is the strong influence of the courts and
be a fact of legal practice, those legal commentators with a particular normative axe to grind
may perform ostensibly descriptive analysis through their favored normative lens--either
consciously or unconsciously-in order to promote the favored normative project by making it
appear to be a descriptive fact of legal practice in some particular area. Steven Hetcher, Non-
Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 863,
865-67 (2001).
204. Landes and Posner argue that much of copyright law is common law. See WILLIAM
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common law processes. Landes and Posner hold that judges are less sub-
ject to interest group pressures than are legislatures. 20'
There are a few reasons why the economic normative premise is
worth exploring in the present context irregardless of one's personal
normative proclivities. First, the clause in the constitution empowering
Congress to provide federal copyright protection is arguably overtly con-
sequentialist in structure, such that one who did not espouse a
descriptive economic thesis overall might nevertheless concur on thisS 208
particular legal interpretation in this particular comer of the law.
Moreover, apart from whatever textual interpretation ultimately proves
most compelling, there is an undeniable prevalence of expressly conse-
quentialist language in leading copyright opinions from leading courts
that interpret Article I, section 8. These cases note that the goal of giving
exclusive right in works of arts and science is to incentivize the produc-
tion of such works in order that they may eventually come to be widely
209disseminated for the general benefit of the public .
Another reason to give the economic premise a thorough hearing is
that Google's strongest argument is consequentialist. In the analysis in
the previous two Parts, we saw that Google will face an uphill battle in
seeking to establish fair use for two of the three types of copying.
Google's best chance is with a court that decides cases based on an eco-
nomic normative assumption. For it will take such motivation to cause a
court to override the outcome against Google that would otherwise result
from legal reasoning based on a within-the-box application of established
207. By application of standard principles of economic analysis, Landes and Posner
conclude that copyright and especially fair use are more likely to be efficient. Id. at 25.
208. "The Congress shall have power.., to Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
209. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The court stated:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and in-
ventors in 'Science and Useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Id. See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,158 (1948). The court
explained:
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.... Chief Justice Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright
monopoly granted by Congress, "The sole interest of the United States and the pri-
mary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to the author or artist serves
to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.
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doctrinal factors. If the economic assumption is correct as a descriptive
matter-and we are here assuming that it is-then courts will be willing
to step outside established doctrine if necessary in order to serve the
higher order normative demand built into the theory.
A final reason to take up an economic approach to the topic is that
this approach is the best place to begin normative analysis when one is
employing a bottom/up methodology from factual context to pure nor-
mative theory.210 This is because economic analysis takes entitlements as
given and then considers how market processes, when working effi-
ciently, will lead those rational actors entitled to these entitlements to
trade them in the marketplace such that they will flow to their most
highly valued uses thereby producing efficient social outcomes.21" ' Thus,
the traditional economic approach assumes the status quo, even if only
for the sake of argument in order to establish a starting point for the trad-
ing of property. In contrast to the role played by the status quo in the
economic model, the role of the status quo is not referenced in the same
way in either the more general utilitarian argument, or in leading non-
consequentialist approaches such as social contractarian approaches.
Each of these approaches routinely seeks to question the entitlements
themselves; the utilitarian asking whether another set might be welfare
maximizing and the social contractarians asking whether another set
might better satisfy the criteria for a normatively justified social contract.
While both top/down and bottom/up approaches have their purposes, and
indeed purposes complementary to one another, a bottom/up approach
better suits the present project, which seeks to make the normative in-
210. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001).
211. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982). Gordon
explains:
[C]opiers of creative works ordinarily can identify and bargain with copyright own-
ers. If copies are made without permission, the court will not use a
"reasonableness" test to second guess whether the copyist's production was in the
public interest. In the ordinary copyright case, the court assumes that the defense
could have, and therefore should have, proceeded through the market.
Id. at 1613. See also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 8 (2003). The authors note:
When market transaction costs are low, as is generally the case when one person
thinks he can use another's property more efficiently than the owner can, efficiency
requires remedies that coerce the would-be user into negotiating with the owner
rather than just taking the owner's property subject to a court's determining what
price (damages) he shall be forced to pay for it-a less efficient method of resource
allocation.
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quiry subsidiary to social scientific inquiry."' Bottom/up approaches
begin with the set of instantiated rules and institutions, whether these are
justified or not, and build the analysis from there.
A. The Economics of Fairness
The above points not withstanding, there is one obvious objection to
making the economic assumption, at least in the present context. While
one might plausibly argue that certain core cases have undeniable conse-
quentialist language and reasoning, this is not so clearly the case with
the concept of fair use. The same plain text approach to interpretation
that may lend credence to a consequentialist reading of Article I, section
8 of the U.S. Constitution, would just as plainly militate against a conse-
quentialist reading of the fair use defense. As noted in Part I, courts
emphasize that fair use is meant to be a fact specific equitable test. Eq-
uity by its nature is open to a variety of normative impulses that may
characterize a population."' Arguably, this variety is expressed in the
four-factor test, which brings into play a number of normative considera-
tions and then seeks to balance these in an equitable manner rather than
214looking exclusively to the social welfare 4. Such variety is anathema to
the unitary normative impulse that that constitutes the utilitarian under-
pinnings of the economic approach.
The economic approach has a decisive response to this objection,
however. Overtly non-consequentialist normative desiderata can never
come into conflict with utilitarian desiderata because, under the theory,
the non-consequentialist norms are ultimately to be understood in terms
of their relation to social welfare. In the classic debate in moral and po-
litical philosophy, it is rights that are sought to be reconciled with social
welfare. In the present context, it is the fair uses of others' copyrighted
content that might be reconciled with social welfare. Indeed, the recon-
ciliation is possible under a weaker mixed normative conception that
holds that some rights may be fundamental while others are created to
promote certain consequentialist outcomes. Under the mixed conception,
rights given to creators of content are not fundamental rights in the sense
that for example the right to free speech may be, but rather rights that are
212. See Coleman, supra note 210.
213. E.g., Gordon, supra note 211, at 1642 ("A fair use holding here also respects the
reliance interests that equity concepts of fairness have long recognized.")
214. The apparent disjunction between fairness and consequentialism appears at the
level of normative high theory as well, as fairness-based approaches are typically contrasted
with, rather than reconciled to, consequentialist approaches. For example, in the most impor-
tant critique of the economic approach and utilitarianism more generally in the last half
century, John Rawls analyzes justice as fairness and attacks a utilitarian account of justice.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press 1971).
Fall 2006]
64 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
by design meant to be fluid in order to adjudicate the tradeoff between
incentives and access in order to maximally promote the arts and sci-
ences in the context of rapid technological change.215 Support for this
flexible instrumentalist approach to rights is seen in the familiar refrain
of courts that the protections afforded by the Copyright Act are to be
interpreted in light of the twin goals of the production and dissemination
of creative works.216
In consequentialist theory, such putatively non-consequentialist
normative factors such as rights or fair use factors are treated as "rules of
thumb." Versions of this approach have been labeled as "rule utilitarian-
ism," "indirect utilitarianism" or "institutional utilitarianism."" 7 The
classic understanding of this indirect approach was laid out in Mill's On
Liberty, where he argued that liberty is best understood as a value that
should be directly promoted in order that social welfare would thereby
be indirectly promoted. An important feature of this conception of
consequentialism is that the goal of welfare maximization may be best
served when some of the various participants in the social practice are
not in a position to seek to maximize social welfare directly. The classic
modem statement of this fundamental point is found in John Rawls's
article "Two Concepts of Rules. 21 9 In one of his illustrative and highly
plausible examples, Rawls argues that a welfare-maximizing judicial
system will not allow for police officers to attempt to be direct welfare
maximizers. The general lesson from the example is that it may best
maximize welfare when not all participants are seeking to maximize
welfare. A parallel logic applies to fair use. A copyright regime that
sought to maximize social welfare by means of incorporating a fair use
rule might nevertheless not seek to encourage all judges to attempt to
maximize welfare by seeking explicitly to do so on each occasion. In the
context of fair use, the rules of thumb are presumably the four factors in
the doctrinal test for fair use.
The question raised by the positive economic assumption is whether
the four-factor test is plausibly interpreted as indirectly promoting social
welfare. Adherents to the economic approach have by and large inter-
preted the fair use test as if it is. In the most cited article on fair use,
Wendy Gordon argues that fair use case law is best understood in eco-
215. See generally, Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 983 (1970). See also Gordon, supra note 211, at 1601-02 (claiming that her model will
be predictive of fair use results that emerge with developing technologies).
216. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F. 2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201 (1954).
217. J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM; FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
218. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (George Routledge & Sons 1869)
(compatibilist account of utility and liberty).
219. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 THE PHIL. REV. 3, 32 (1955).
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nomic terms as serving to respond to market failures. Gordon argues
that the four-factor test is only a proxy, one that sometimes fails to take
account of the key role that market failure may play in affecting the util-
221ity calculation. She argues that courts are best understood as applying
222
a three-part test. In other words, Gordon's claim can be interpreted in
utilitarian terms as the claim that the doctrinal set of rules serve to indi-
rectly promote social welfare. Thus, an account such as Gordon's leads
to the conclusion that there is no fundamental conceptual difficulty in
seeking to provide an economic interpretation of fair use. Whether in
fact this economic interpretation of fair use doctrine is the best descrip-
tive account is of course a separate matter. With the concern regarding a
fundamental incompatibility between fair use and the economic ap-
proach resolved, the next Section considers the economic thesis on its
merits, understood as a descriptive or positive thesis.
B. Google Print as Builder of the Digital Library ofAlexandria
The most compelling utilitarian argument in favor of Google Print is
ultimately based on the normative claim regarding the important social
purpose it appears capable of serving. The pursuit of knowledge is a very
widely shared goal and there is a very strong argument that Google Print
would promote learning to an extraordinary degree as it would provide
what its proponents describe as an enhanced electronic card catalogue of
almost unbelievable power. This in turn would lead to online access to
220. Gordon, supra note 211, at 1601 ("On a more fundamental level, the Article will
illustrate how the courts and Congress have employed fair use to permit uncompensated trans-
fers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the market.").
221. See id. at 1604.
222. See id. at 1601. The author states:
Specifically, it will be argued that fair use doctrine, though sometimes called an
"equitable rule of reason" for which no definition is possible[citing the House Re-
port], has at bottom three straightforward concerns. Where (1) defendant could not
appropriately purchase the desired use through the market; (2) transferring control
over the use to defendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the copyright
owner's incentives would not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to pro-
ceed, courts have in the past considered, and should in the future consider
defendant's use "fair."
Id. Note Gordon's remark that courts and Congress "have in the past" and "should in the fu-
ture" apply this test. In other words, Gordon is being explicit that she is making a positive
social scientific as well as a normative claim. If the model is in fact descriptive, one would
expect it to be predictive as well, other things equal. Indeed, Gordon claims that it is. She
writes, "Overall, by unifying the various traditional fair use factors into one economic model,
the Article aims to serve as an aid to predicting fair use results and as a guide to future devel-
opment of the doctrine." Id. at 1602. In the present context, then, we will want to see if
Gordon's approach does provide a guide to future development of fair use doctrine in the
context of Google Print and search engines more generally.
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literally millions of the best books in the world. Clearly it is this potenti-
ality that has caused the most stir among Google Print's supporters.
Given this huge potential boon to social welfare via increased access to
knowledge, there is, other things equal, clearly a very strong argument in
favor of Google Print on social welfare grounds.
Note in addition that Google Print provides more than the services of
a card catalogue. For it is not that often that one would get enough in-
formation simply from looking at a card such that one would not need to
then go find the book. An example might be where one was looking for
the year of publication of a book, which could be found on the card
without actually getting the book off the shelf. By contrast, snippets will
provide much more information than merely bibliographical information
and hence will be of potentially greater value. Access to snippets of text
will be of tremendous value to users such that often they will have no
further need to track down the entire text of the book. Thus, Google
Print's proponents may be unduly modest as it is more accurate to say
that Google Print is much more than a card catalogue. Indeed, it is more
accurate to say that the database of complete copies of millions of works
is not the card catalogue but instead is the collection of works, that is,
the library itself. Google Print is a nascent version of the Library of Al-
223
exandria in cyberspace.
Setting aside for the moment any countervailing considerations of
harm to plaintiffs, this is undoubtedly a tremendous benefit to users.
While book owners may complain, the fact that Google Print is not
really just a card catalogue may be a big point in its favor. It might in-
deed be the case that the use of snippets proved to be so useful that
millions and millions of searchers queried for snippets and were suffi-
ciently satisfied that they did not buy books at issue but this could be a
good thing from a utilitarian perspective, so long as incentives to pro-
duce new works were not overly dampened.
In addition, Google will be able to argue that those social benefits
may be achieved with a minimum of harm to book owners due to the
design of this program and in particular the manner in which it effec-
224tively incorporates an opt out provision. In fact, some have argued that
223. Google is making serious headway toward this achievement, which would be not
only a great contribution to human knowledge but a personal achievement of the founders,
given their pro-higher-education values. The irony is that they have to deny the very existence
of the revolutionary edifice they are creating, because the Library is a physical embodiment
and thus suspect under copyright law. It is a physical embodiment because Google copies all
relevant content into computer server farms. See John Markoff & Saul Hansell, Hiding in
Plain Sight, Google Seeks an Expansion of Power, N.Y. TtMES, June 14, 2006, at Al.
224. See Michelle Kessler, Google Library Project Runs into Resistance, USA TODAY,
Aug. 15, 2005, at 5B (noting that free speech advocates say that Google should not give pub-
lishers the choice of opting out, because copying the books for searches is fair use). " 'The
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book owners will be benefited instead of harmed, due to the prospect of
increased book sales. As noted in Part I, Google has stated that it will as
a matter of policy allow the copyright owners that do not wish to partici-
pate in Google Print to opt out. Google claims that most owners will
prefer to take part in the Google Print project."' Thus, it makes more
sense as a matter of minimizing transactions costs for those who do not
wish to participate to opt out. As they are probably relatively few firms
who will opt out, it will lower social transactions costs to have this
smaller number take the trouble to opt out than for a much larger number
to take the trouble to opt in. Thus, Google Print advocates will argue,
there is a significant efficiency gain to adopting opt-out, as this single
move promises to dramatically reduce transaction costs.
For example, Jonathan Band's argument is that opt-out makes sense
as most websites will want to be included in Google Print, so it is more
efficient to have the few that want to opt out explicitly do so. Band ar-
gues that there is an implied license. This argument is fallacious,
however. It conflates books with websites in which there is indeed a
good argument for an implied license given that the websites are open to
the public. The opposite is true of the files containing the content of pub-
lishers, which they make an effort to keep from general availability to
the public.
As noted in Part I, the response of plaintiffs has been well put by Pat
Shroeder when she said in regard to this opt out provision and Google
Print generally, that it turned copyright on its ear because it gives initial
control of the works to Google to use for its purposes and then put the
226
onus on plaintiffs to take an action to opt out to protect their works.
The economic response refuses to accept the need to preference the
status quo as the metaphor of standing something on its head does. To
the remark that Google Print turns copyright on its head the economic
response is: "So what?" If the moral demands of social welfare
point of copyright law is not to give people absolute control over everything they write,' says
Jason Schultz, a lawyer for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 'it is to compensate artists and
authors for the works that they create.' " Id. Google's library won't take away from book sales,
and could even increase them. Id.
225. "The project is very similar to web search. In order to electronically index a web-
page, you need to make a copy of it. In order to electronically index a book, we have to make
a digital copy of the book. As with web search, the copies we make are used to direct people
to the books. Our experience with web search is that many people ask to have their web pages
included in our search results and very few ask to be excluded." Google Website, supra note
69.
226. See Helm, supra note 22 (quoting American Association of Publishers CEO Patricia
Schroeder as stating, "Google's procedure shifts the responsibility for preventing infringement
to the copyright owner rather than the user, turning every principle of copyright law on its
ear.").
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maximization call for an upending of traditional doctrine, then it is all to
the good that this shift occur, and as soon as possible.
The fact that Google Print may dramatically enhance the utility of its
users does not lead to any direct normative conclusion, however. This is
true for a couple of reasons, the first of which is obvious: Google Print
may cause significant costs as well as benefits and these must be fac-
tored into the social welfare calculation. The means to argue for the
contrary position that Google Print is not a fair use would be to identify
a countervailing economic harm that outweighed the aforementioned
benefit. The harm stressed by publishers is that they depend on the reve-
• .. 227
nue stream from book sales to sustain their economic viability. The
implication of their claim is that Google Print may provide a stimulus to
social welfare on a static analysis, but in equilibrium it will lead to the
decline of the book publishing business and thus kill the goose that lays
the golden egg.
This tradeoff is an instantiation of the more general tradeoff at the
core of the economic analysis of copyright between "incentives" and
"access." Google is claiming that it will promote social welfare to in-
crease user access to snippets by finding Google Print a fair use, while
the publishers claim that this will in fact decrease social welfare by de-
stroying the market for academic books, and thus ultimately the
228incentives of writers to write.
The publishers' damage claim poses a bit of a puzzle. Why do pub-
lishers focus on the damage claim from lost sales when it is the loss of
licensing revenues that appears most significant? One possible explana-
tion is that they worry that the licensing argument is more a question of
who gets more rents from the activity. For the economist, it will not mat-
ter which group benefits more so long as the aggregate is maximized.
Thus, the claim by publishers of unjust enrichment by Google at their
expense is in danger of being met with the response, "So what," if it
turns out that social welfare is best served when Google is able to deliver
snippets (and all that entails, without first seeking permission).
The owners of orphan works cannot make this claim, however, as
there is no extant business to destroy. Their claim to harm is instead that
227. It is unlikely that Google Print would kill the academic book business. This is not
the main fear that should compel rejection of the Google Print project on utilitarian grounds.
So the issue is not one of survival of the academic publishing industry. Nevertheless, I con-
clude that social welfare is likely to be better promoted in a world where owners keep control
of their exclusive rights regarding licensing of digital copies of their works. The reason is that
there is a chance that there is a close possible world in which Google Print or something mate-
rially equivalent to it, will come about through bargaining with publishers, and that this would
be a preferable world on utilitarian grounds.
228. An inconvenient fact for plaintiffs is that academics' main incentives to publish
have little to do with book sales.
The Half-Fairness of Google's Plan
they do not get something they are entitled to, revenues they are due as
owners of the works. While it is understandable that plaintiffs focus on
the harms to themselves for economic analysis it is necessary to inquire
as well as to whether there are harms to third parties. Plaintiffs do not
say much about third-party harms. This may mean a few things; that they
think there are no such harms, or no colorable arguments to be made for
such harms, or they do not think the court would care, which, if true,
would appear to militate against the descriptive economic account, as a
welfare-maximizing court should care.
The second reason is based on the need for consequentialist analysis
generally to take account of relevant counterfactual situations. Seem-
ingly the question is just that of which outcome is more productive of
social welfare; a world in which Google Print is found to be a fair use or
a world where it is not. If the relevant court wants to promote welfare, it
will simply choose accordingly. Despite the seeming straightforwardness
of this line of reasoning, things are more complicated. It may be the case
that a world with Google Print is better than a world without it, yet this
does not entail that Google Print should be found to be a fair use. There
may be other means of getting to the outcome in which Google Print, or
something substantially like it, exists and yet where content owners re-
tain rights over their works of the sort they currently enjoy, such that no
exception need be made to the usual provision of exclusive rights, which
stands as presumptively justified due to its explicit provisions in the
Constitution and the Copyright Act. In other words, a close possible
world with the benefits, or perhaps most of them, but without the costs,
or less of them, such that overall, the situation is preferable.
The policy problem presented here is tremendous. What mechanism
or regulatory structure is there that is competent to make such a complex
determination? It is one thing to place decision-making authority in
some entity such as a governing body or a court, it is quite another thing
to claim that the output of this authority is capable of producing compe-
tent results. If Congress were deciding the issue as a matter of federal
law, it might hold hearings, call witnesses and experts and perhaps
commission a formal cost/benefit analysis. In reality, however, the policy
choice will be presented in the context of civil litigation and thus will be
determined by those limited means available to courts. As a practical
matter, this will mean no formal cost/benefit analysis but instead a more
intuitive application by the court.2'9 The conventional view is that courts
appreciate their shaky ability to reliably determine social welfare and
accordingly look to the presence or absence of bargaining between the
parties as the best indicator of whether the resources at issue are being
229. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 14 (5th ed. 1998).
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put to their most economically efficient use. 23 If a use has its highest
social value in the hands of a non-owner, then this party will contract
with the owner in order to secure usage. Thus, if Google is in a position
to make a welfare-maximizing use of the copies of plaintiffs' texts, then
it will be in a position to bargain with plaintiffs for its usage. Accord-
ingly, courts will look to whether or not Google has bargained with
plaintiffs for use of the texts. 3 In fact, Google and the publishers initi-
ated such discussions but they failed to result in any agreement. This
would appear to indicate that Google is not the most efficient user of the
resource. Before reaching this conclusion, however, there is one crucial
consideration that a welfare maximizing court will seek to determine,
namely, whether there are any "market failures" that preclude efficient
232bargaining from occurring.
For example, in the classic explication of the market failure ap-
proach to fair use, Wendy Gordon argues that the leading early case,
Williams & Wilkins is best understood as a situation in which the court
found a fair use because of the practical inability of the large numbers of
individual medical journal copiers to negotiate an agreement with the
.• 233
owners of the copyrights in the articles. Because of this practical in-
ability of all the individual owners of medical articles to cost-effectively
negotiate separately, bargaining did not occur. But the reason bargains
are not struck is due to high transaction costs. In general, where transac-
tion costs are high, a court on the economic account seeks to mimic what
the market outcome would be if high transaction costs were not deter-
234
mining the outcome. Thus, in Williams, it is not enough to consider
plaintiffs' harm because the determinative consideration is whether a
market failure is preventing an efficient outcome in the marketplace that
exists for photocopies of articles. The conceptual importance of this ar-
gument is fundamental as it provides a criterion for determining fair use
outcomes that goes beyond the test for harm to plaintiffs as crucially
contained in the doctrinal account. The market failure argument applies
230. See Gordon, supra note 211.
231. In general, the economic approach has looked more fondly on courts as efficiency
maximizers in comparison to legislatures. This is because legislators are more open to lobby-
ing influences of the sort studied by public choice analysis. This idea is at the core of Landes
and Posner's explanation as to why intellectual property law may not be susceptible to the sort
of systematic efficiency analysis of the sort found in their analysis of tort law. Landes and
Posner, however, argue that certain doctrines may be best understood as strongly of common
law influence despite their formal origins in statutes. This is an important claim because it led
Landes and Posner to conclude that it is therefore more likely that the fair use doctrine will be
efficient. See Landes & Posner, supra note 204, at 45.
232. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16
(1960).
233. Gordon, supra note 211.
234. Landes & Posner, supra note 211, at 32-33.
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an alternative criterion such that a particular use might be harmful to the
plaintiff but nevertheless fair because high transactions costs prevent the
parties from bargaining to an efficient result.
Gordon argues that in Williams & Wilkins it was recognition of this
economic fact that led the court to find fair use.235 Thus, the economic
approach would prescribe that we look for structural features in the
Google Print facts that might plausibly lead to a conclusion that a market
failure is present. First, consider whether there is a holdout problem that
might hamper bargaining.
There does not appear to be a holdout problem. It is not a situation in
which one publisher could stop Google Print from going forward. One
publisher's decision to refrain from licensing use of its content could
stop Google Print from being complete, but unlike a small parcel of land
in the middle of an urban block in which possession of the whole block
is needed to erect a large building, Google Print does not need to be
complete in order to be of great value. Note that this is true of traditional
236libraries. Presumably, this includes the Library of Alexandria as well,
for while it was fabled to contain all the world's knowledge, this is
surely a fable. Thus, there appears to be no reason that Google could not
build out a library by incrementally adding to its database over time. As
a result, there is no holdout problem precluding efficient bargaining from
proceeding.
Next, consider whether there may exist a situation parallel to Wil-
liams & Wilkins such that large numbers of potential bargainers preclude
the occurrence of efficient bargaining. This consideration appears to de-
pend on which plaintiffs are being considered. If we consider the
publishers first, the issue is unclear. There are 125 plaintiffs. Is this too
large a number so as to permit bargaining? Seemingly not, as each pub-
lisher will be owner of a large number of books, such that a publisher
235. Gordon, supra 211, at 1647-52.
236. Id. at 1670.
237. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (1972) (discussing
the means by which legal decision makers may deal with the potential for a market failure due
to the hold out problem, and suggesting that fair use should be awarded if the typical person is
likely to consent); Gordon, supra note 211, at 1629-30. This formulation is problematic in the
context of Google Print, however, as there is no typical person's action apart from the extant
conventional structure. Contrary to Google's suggestion, whether owners will wish to opt in
cannot be determined apart from background conditions. If the law were that Google Print was
a fair use and many publishers were choosing not to opt out, then it might make sense for an
individual to act the same. Yet she may prefer a situation in which all had ownership and con-
trol and were able to license the use. This is a collective action problem. The more time
Google has to ensconce the practice in the relative absence of external regulation as currently
exists, the more it will be in the interest of any particular owner to participate.
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plays a role as an aggregator for bargaining purposes, somewhat similar
• • 238
to the performing rights organizations.
In addition, the publishers are represented by a trade association that
is potentially capable of discussing the Google Print project with
Google. Further, Google will be able to easily find the corporate offices
of the publishers, complete with legal departments staffed by lawyers
whose business it is to draft and negotiate contracts. In sum, potential
transaction costs appear well contained and bargaining between Google
and the publishers appears imminently possible.
In stark contrast to the case against market failure for non-orphan
works just considered, there is a plausible argument based on transac-
tions costs for concluding that Google Print should be a fair use with
respect to its unauthorized use of orphan works. It is clear that social
welfare would be served by Google being able to offer snippets from the
books of these authors yet it may not be practical for Google to negotiate
for such rights from the owners due to the potentially great cost of locat-
ing each defunct company and determining who owns the rights to books
these companies published years earlier. In addition, because these are
defunct companies, it does not harm them in the direct way it harms on-
going concerns. The foregoing analysis appears to bring us to an
important conclusion-a welfare-maximizing regime should not find fair
use for published books but should find fair use for orphan works. In the
case of the orphan works, there appears to be a structural situation of
market failure that precludes efficient bargaining between Google and
the owners of the texts in question from occurring. Thus, Google is in a
better position to win a fair use argument against the random publishers
as compared to the publisher plaintiffs.
The relative ease of contracting with publishers raises a bit of a puz-
zle. If Google Print is of such great potential social value and if Google
is good at extracting revenues from its search model, and if Google and
copyright owners are in a situation in which contracting can be done
relatively inexpensively, then why has bargaining not occurred? One
might think that the obvious answer to this question is that Google is
simply adopting the aggressive position that why should it pay for some-
thing that it might get for free? If it can win on fair use, then the use is
free and there is no need for bargaining. But this is only partially true as
the fair use route is clearly not costless, as is evident in the fact that it
has landed Google in the present lawsuit.
It is my supposition that the answer may have to do with the impor-
tance Google places on the goal that its projects scale. It is worth a
moment to discuss the topic of scalability, in the sense it can be said to
238. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 211, at 9 n.30.
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be a value for Google. In particular, it matters to Google that its projects
scale so that automation may be facilitated. 2' 9 For example, Google
searches scale to the internet such that as Google adds new pages to its
database, these become searchable in the same manner as those pages in
the pre-existing content of the database. Presumably, Google wants the
Google Print project to scale as well. It will not do so if Google needs to
engage in clearing rights for each of the millions of works it would like
to have in its database. This raises the question, however, that if the con-
cern is scalability, then Google would appear to be well advised to treat
the two types of works differently in order to reflect differences in the
extent to which each type may scale. In particular, if the publishers serve
as content aggregators who, like ASCAP,2 ° etc., serve to lower transac-
tion costs, then it may be possible to transact with this group and thus a
project involving these works might scale. Owners of orphan works
could then be dealt with as a distinct matter.
My supposition, however, is that Google would not find this to be an
attractive solution as these two categories of works may not be so easily
separable. There are legal reasons why Google might be well advised to
align its strategy toward those two types of works. By entering into ne-
gotiations with publishers, Google arguably makes it more difficult for
itself when it comes to mounting a defense against the owners of orphan
works, for how can Google say it has a fair use right to these works
when it has implicitly conceded that it has no such right to publishers'
works (which it arguably would concede by the act of entering into ne-
gotiations with publishers).
Perhaps then we can discern Google's overall strategy. It is to be
able to get access to the works of the odd and sundry owners whose
works are not affiliated with any extant publishers. Thus, the real fear for
Google is not that they will have to license with publishers but that this
may have negative implications as to whether Google must legally seek
to license orphan works as well, or in the absence of a licensing ar-
rangement, forego including these works in its database. 2
239. See Batelle, supra note 33, at 129.
240. ASCAP is the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, which is a
performance fights organization that promotes bulk licensing of performance rights. ASCAP,
About ASCAP, http://www.ascap.comlabout/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
241. This is an important issue for the utilitarian analysis of Google Print as the issue of
whether or not these works end up included in the database available to researchers for
searches represents a significant concern, as a database that is more comprehensive is better
than one that is not. Surely it is a core value of copyright that the tools available for research-
ing are as comprehensive and hence objective and truth producing as possible.
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C. Save the Orphans: Why the Economic Account
Must Be Superseded
The previous Part provided an economic account of the Google
Print project. We determined that a court functioning in an economic
manner will be likely to find fair use for one set of works but not an-
other, namely, for orphaned works but not for those owned by extant
publishers. We can view a court's fair use determination as an instance
of its heeding its own policy prescription-making the normative
descriptive-by working through a practical syllogism containing the
economic desiderata as a minor premise, and combining it with particu-
lar propositions drawn from the facts of Google, in order to arrive at an
action-guiding practical conclusion to treat the two classes of texts dif-
ferently according to the divergent levels of transaction costs associated
with each.
In this section, this practical conclusion will be evaluated. I conclude
that the result, while a perfectly sensible piece of common law reason-
ing, is nevertheless flawed in that it deals with the legacy problem of
orphan works but provides poor guidance on a going forward basis for
moving to a regulatory regime for a world where the orphan works prob-
lem may be ameliorated such that creative works across the board may
be treated in a unified manner, making them more scalable and thus
more likely to be subject to the efficiency promoting influence of auto-
mation of the sort that leading internet players such as Google are
demonstrating themselves to be greatly skilled in exploiting.
Once it is acknowledged that it would be preferable to treat all works
under the same fair use rule, there are two options: treat orphans like
non-orphans or vice versa. Some argue that we should treat non-orphans
like orphans, for the reason that otherwise orphans will be underuti-
lized.242 I will argue in the opposite direction that we should treat
orphans like non-orphans, as much as possible. By this I mean that we
should seek to reduce the transaction costs involved in orphan works
such that they will naturally call out to be treated like other works.
My policy recommendation is that we recognize that orphan works
should be treated as a legacy problem and we should work to reduce the
transaction costs so that exclusive rights may do what they are assigned
to do. Orphan works owners' best argument is the Texaco argument that
even if fair use made sense prior to the ability to solve the transaction
cost problem, once it becomes possible to solve it, then the assumed
economic desiderata calls for this. It follows that fair use should be de-
242. This is essentially the position of those who have taken the pro-commons position
in the central debate in contemporary copyright between those who oppose further enclosure
and those who favor it. See generally LESSIG, supra note 7.
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nied if market failure could be cured.243 In the case of the publishers, it
can be plausibly argued that there is no market failure. Google is simply
choosing to violate rights instead of negotiating. Undoubtedly, the own-
ers of orphan works, will argue that their market failure could be cured
as well. The important question, then, is what would such a cure look
like? Whether the market failure of the orphan works can be solved and
at what cost is thus the important question with which to come to terms.
My criticism of the conventional framework as entailed in Landes
and Posner's account is that it takes high transaction costs as given,
when we need instead to view these costs are prime suspects for a for-
ward thinking policy effort directed at seeking to discover whether and
how transactions costs associated with orphaned copyrightable works
may be reduced. 24 Transaction costs are at the root of the fair use finding
for orphan works. If it were to be possible to reduce the transaction costs
that result in orphan works, then these works may merit different treat-
ment. 24 For example, one means of becoming an orphan work is to be
243. See Gordon, supra note 211, at 1627.
244. Landes and Posner argue that the inherently higher transaction costs of intellectual
property dictate that the level of intellectual property protection, "propertization" in their
words, should correspondingly be lower. The logic of this claim may be flipped around, how-
ever, such that the implication of Landes and Posner's analysis is that as transaction costs are
lowered, propertization should go up. At the extreme, we will want to explore whether if
transaction costs are lowered monumentally, should propertization go up monumentally as
well. See, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 211, at 7-8, 13.
Some of Landes and Posner's remarks suggest that there is a sort of immutable relation-
ship that obtains regarding transaction costs vis-A-vis physical property as compared with
intellectual property. I would suggest that we treat this question as completely open. Surely it
is worth asking whether there is some barrier that may be permeated such that the transaction
costs of intellectual property not only come down but come down dramatically such that they
pale in comparison to those from physical property. In the present context, it will be worth
exploring whether the transaction costs associated with orphan works may be significantly
reduced. The manner in which traditional fair use doctrine treated out-of-print books suggests
that a court is likely to see implications for fair use analysis if orphan works become less
prevalent due to a reduction in transaction costs due to technological advance. The considera-
tion of whether a work is out of print is a traditional doctrinal consideration that may have
particular relevance in the context of Google Print. See Gordon, supra note 211, at 1627. The
doctrine is readily explainable in economic terms, as Gordon does. When it comes to digital
copies, it no longer makes sense for works to go out of print. Conceivably, the transaction
costs for delivering works could be reduced dramatically. Thus, the out-of print rationale for
fair use may be removed by new technologies that dramatically decrease transaction costs.
245. Note that the policy concern is not solely that of the minimization of transaction
costs. After all, transactions costs are inherent in the notion of property-to own is to be able
to seek the law's aid in creating a big transaction cost for anyone who would seek to exert
their own freedom in a way that would impede on one's property. There can be no ownership
of digital content if there is no ability to stop unauthorized persons from violating one's sec-
tion 106 rights. Thus, the economic goal is not to minimize transactions costs but to optimize
them or minimize unnecessary ones. Google must incur transactions costs if content owners'
rights in their content are to be accorded exclusive domain of the sort contemplated under
current copyright law.
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out of print. Fair use doctrine has historically been more lenient toward
works that are out of print when it comes to finding an unauthorized use
to be fair. This doctrine is sensible from an economic perspective as
works that are out of print have much higher transaction costs associated
with them. There are value-maximizing transactions to be had if only the
parties could come together. But it will be a better world where these
books are not out of print because it will be easier for potential users to
track them down. This is what needs to happen for orphan works; they
need to become more available. The problem with many of the ones that
exist is that they are pre-digital. Back when they were published, presses
had to set plates, etc. In a digital world, however, storage of the texts for
distribution and sales is dramatically reduced. Landes and Posner fail to
see the important degree to which the transaction costs associated with
intellectual property are flexible. There is perhaps no better example
than Google itself. It has dramatically lowered the cost of bringing
highly desirable content to users. Thus, the challenge is to lower the
transaction costs associated with the sorts of works that have formerly
become orphans. The end goal would be that all works are treated the
same, authors' exclusive rights are respected, and the functional equiva-
lent of Google Print exists.
CONCLUSION
This Article has studied the Google Print project and the lawsuits it
has spawned. We first looked in detail at the project itself in order to
fully grasp its monumental importance. Next, we began a detailed doc-
trinal analysis in order to better predict future outcomes. This analysis
was conducted first under existing doctrine and then under the economic
assumption that courts are social welfare maximizers in their activities
involving fair use. While some have suggested that such an analysis
would support a finding of fair use across the board, I argue instead that
the major category of works owned by publishers should not be a fair
use. I argue, however, that the same transaction cost argument that ar-
gued against fair use in the context of the publisher texts would support
it in the context of orphan works. I argue further that this created the
right sort of incentive for owners to not let their works, their creative
progeny, become orphans.
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